# Apache Roller XML-RPC deserialization (CVE-2026-129448, CVE-2026-82384): detection pack

**Pack version 1.0.0 (17 Nov 2026, sources checked 11:35 to 11:50 UTC).** Apache Roller's XML-RPC endpoint
(`/roller-services/xmlrpc`) accepts the XML-RPC library's vendor extension types and deserializes them before it
authenticates the caller, so an unauthenticated remote attacker can run code. Apache first published this as
CVE-2026-82384 (Roller 6.1.5 only) and on 17 Nov 2026 published CVE-2026-129448 for Roller 4.0.0 through 6.1.4,
saying the flaw "is being actively exploited". Apache (the CNA) scores both **CVSS 3.1 9.8 Critical**.

Fix: upgrade to Roller 6.1.6 or later (6.1.7 is the current "best available" release on the Roller downloads page).
Patch now regardless of KEV status. The KQL in this pack has NOT been run against a live tenant. Apache publishes no
indicators of compromise, so every hunt and rule in this pack is OUR PATTERN; we have not invented any IOC. Research
is credited to security researchers only.

## Verified facts

| Fact | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-129448 | Roller 4.0.0 through 6.1.4 (record: version 4.0.0, less than 6.1.5). Published on cve.org 17 Nov 2026 11:03 UTC (record title: "releases before 6.1.5") | cve.org record (Apache CNA) |
| Same flaw | "This is the same vulnerability as CVE-2026-82384, which listed only Apache Roller 6.1.5 as affected." | cve.org record; Apache notice of 17 Nov 2026 |
| Exploitation | "This issue is being actively exploited." No attack details, dates or indicators are published | cve.org record; Apache notice of 17 Nov 2026 |
| CVE-2026-82384 | Roller 6.1.5. Published on cve.org 28 Sep 2026 07:47 UTC. "The servlet is mapped unconditionally, so parsing occurs even when the global XML-RPC feature is set to disabled; no non-default configuration is required for this path." No exploitation statement | cve.org record; Apache announcement of 25 Sep 2026 |
| Score | CVSS 3.1 9.8 Critical, `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`, CWE-502, for both CVEs (Apache CNA score) | cve.org records; NVD |
| NVD status | CVE-2026-129448: Received (published on NVD 17 Nov 2026 11:17 UTC; no NVD score of its own). CVE-2026-82384: Deferred (published on NVD 28 Sep 2026 08:16 UTC) | NVD |
| Older versions | Versions before 4.0.0 are not stated either way (record default status "unknown") | cve.org record |
| Fix | "Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Roller 6.1.6 or later, which disables the extension types and rejects XML-RPC requests when the XML-RPC feature is disabled." | cve.org record; Apache notice of 17 Nov 2026 |
| Workaround | "Users who cannot upgrade right away should set "enabledForExtensions" to "false" in WEB-INF/web.xml, or remove the "/roller-services/xmlrpc" servlet mapping, and restart Roller." | cve.org record; Apache notice of 17 Nov 2026 |
| Admin UI toggle | "Disabling XML-RPC in the administration UI is not enough, because older versions deserialize the request before checking that setting." | cve.org record; Apache notice of 17 Nov 2026 |
| Fix code | Apache pull request 171 ("Disable vendor extension types on the XML-RPC servlet", merged 5 Sep 2026) changes `enabledForExtensions` from `true` to `false` and adds `XmlRpcEnabledFilter`, which closes `/roller-services/xmlrpc` when `webservices.enableXmlRpc` is off. We confirmed both in the 6.1.6 source tag; the 4.0, 5.2.0, 6.1.3 and 6.1.5 tags ship `enabledForExtensions` set to `true` with the servlet mapped | Apache pull request 171; Apache Roller source tags |
| KEV | Neither CVE is in CISA KEV (catalogue version 2026.11.13, released 13 Nov 2026 20:24 UTC, 1,781 entries, checked 17 Nov 2026 11:48 UTC). The CISA ADP entry on the CVE-2026-129448 record (SSVC, 17 Nov 2026 11:26 UTC) says Exploitation "none", Automatable "yes", Technical Impact "total"; the CNA text says actively exploited | CISA KEV feed; cve.org record |
| Current release | Roller 6.1.7 is listed as "best available"; Apache asks readers to check the 6.1.7 release notes for behaviour changes before upgrading a live site | Roller downloads page |

### Apache's two list posts (cited for what each says)

* **25 Sep 2026, 20:12 UTC, announce list** (thread `cc0jck13nb9vvcmzxzwotr6n16mx28z9`): the CVE-2026-82384
  announcement. Affected: Roller 6.1.5 only. It does not mention exploitation and gives no workaround beyond upgrading.
* **17 Nov 2026, 11:02 UTC, Roller user list** (thread `lnz4s26tv6hdo03wngtdbpfj4hg4gtds`): the CVE-2026-129448
  notice. Affected: Roller 4.0.0 before 6.1.5. It says the flaw is actively exploited and gives the `web.xml`
  workaround and the admin UI warning.

### Timeline (UTC)

| When | What | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 29 Aug 2026 | Fix pull request opened | Apache pull request 171 |
| 5 Sep 2026 | Fix merged into Roller's main branch | Apache pull request 171 |
| 25 Sep 2026, 20:12 | CVE-2026-82384 announced (6.1.5) | Apache announce list |
| 28 Sep 2026, 07:47 | CVE-2026-82384 published on cve.org (NVD 08:16; now Deferred) | cve.org; NVD |
| 14 Nov 2026 | CVE-2026-129448 reserved | cve.org record |
| 17 Nov 2026, 11:02 | Apache notice: 4.0.0 to 6.1.4 affected, actively exploited | Apache Roller user list |
| 17 Nov 2026, 11:03 | CVE-2026-129448 published on cve.org | cve.org record |
| 17 Nov 2026, 11:17 | CVE-2026-129448 published on NVD (Received) | NVD |

## Corrections to the flag we were given

* The lists.apache.org link in the flag (`cc0jck13...`) is the 25 Sep 2026 announcement of CVE-2026-82384, which
  covers 6.1.5 only and does not mention exploitation. The 17 Nov 2026 notice that widens the range and says the flaw
  is actively exploited is thread `lnz4s26tv6hdo03wngtdbpfj4hg4gtds` (teammate note, verified).
* NVD's "Received" status applies to CVE-2026-129448 only; CVE-2026-82384 is Deferred on NVD (teammate note,
  verified).
* CVE-2026-129448 appeared on cve.org at 11:03 UTC, before NVD (11:17 UTC, as the flag says).
* The 9.8 score is Apache's (the CNA); NVD has not scored CVE-2026-129448. Because the CNA score is 9.0 or higher,
  "Critical" is Apache's rating, not our framing.
* "Actively exploited" is Apache's statement; the CISA ADP entry on the same record (11:26 UTC) still says
  Exploitation "none" and neither CVE is in KEV yet. We report both.
* 6.1.6 is the minimum fixed release; 6.1.7 is now the current release. Versions before 4.0.0 are not covered by
  either record.
* The `rO0AB` marker in the flag is OUR PATTERN, not a vendor indicator. We checked it: it is the base64 form of the
  Java serialization stream header (0xACED, version 5) in Oracle's serialization specification. We add the Apache
  XML-RPC extension type `ex:serializable`, which Apache's XML-RPC documentation describes as a serialized Java
  object sent as base64.

## Unverified items

* Which of the log tables in the KQL you collect, and whether any of them holds request bodies [UNVERIFIED].
* Whether Defender software inventory lists Roller (KQL Q6c) [UNVERIFIED].
* How exploitation looks in logs: Apache publishes no detail, so the hunts look for the vulnerable path, Java
  serialized data and common follow-on activity (OUR PATTERN).
* When exploitation started: not published. The hunts start on 25 Sep 2026 (OUR choice).

## Advice

**Apache's advice (credited to Apache):** upgrade to Roller 6.1.6 or later. If you cannot upgrade right away, set
`enabledForExtensions` to `false` in `WEB-INF/web.xml`, or remove the `/roller-services/xmlrpc` servlet mapping, and
restart Roller. Turning XML-RPC off in the administration UI is not enough on older versions.

**OUR ADVICE (CybaVerse, not from Apache):**

1. Find every Roller install: run KQL Q6, Q6b and Q6c, and check Tomcat servers for a webapp whose `web.xml`
   maps `/roller-services/xmlrpc`. Run `scripts/check-roller.sh` (or `Check-Roller.ps1`) on each webapp folder.
2. Upgrade to 6.1.7 (6.1.6 at minimum) and redeploy the `web.xml` that ships with it; an old `web.xml` copied over
   a new install keeps the extension types on (the checker reports this as REVIEW, exit 3).
3. Until patched, apply Apache's workaround and also block or restrict POST to `/roller-services/xmlrpc` at the
   reverse proxy or WAF if you do not use XML-RPC blog clients.
4. Treat any internet-facing Roller 4.0.0 to 6.1.5 that had the extension types on as possibly compromised, because
   Apache says the flaw is exploited and no configuration was needed: run KQL Q1 to Q5 back as far as your retention
   allows.
5. If you find signs of compromise: isolate the server, keep Tomcat, proxy and WAF logs, look for new JSP files and
   unknown processes, rotate the database password and any other credentials the Roller server holds (for example
   in `roller-custom.properties`), and rebuild on a fixed release rather than cleaning in place.
6. KEV due dates apply to US federal agencies only (BOD 26-04). If CISA adds these CVEs, that changes nothing for
   you: patch now.

## Hunts (KQL, Microsoft Sentinel and Microsoft Defender XDR)

File: `kql/apache-roller-xmlrpc-hunting.kql`. The KQL in this pack has NOT been run against a live tenant; it
parses with 0 errors against the schemas modelled in `tests/kql_parse.ps1`, which proves syntax only.

| ID | Label | What it looks for | Tables |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | OUR PATTERN | POSTs to `/roller-services/xmlrpc`, with large requests flagged (OUR 10,000 byte threshold) | CommonSecurityLog, W3CIISLog, AGWAccessLogs |
| Q2 | OUR PATTERN [UNVERIFIED field availability] | `rO0AB`, `aced0005`, `ex:serializable` or the XML-RPC extension namespace in logged request content | CommonSecurityLog, AGWFirewallLogs |
| Q3 | OUR PATTERN | Tomcat Java process (command line mentions catalina, tomcat or roller) starting a shell | DeviceProcessEvents |
| Q3b | OUR PATTERN | Any Java process starting a shell, per device | DeviceProcessEvents |
| Q4 | OUR PATTERN | `.jsp` or `.jspx` written under a `webapps` folder by Java | DeviceFileEvents |
| Q5 | OUR PATTERN | Outbound public connections from Java on hosts that look like Roller servers, rare destinations first | DeviceNetworkEvents |
| Q6 | OUR PATTERN | Roller exposure inventory: hosts answering `/roller-ui/` or `/roller-services/` | CommonSecurityLog, W3CIISLog, AGWAccessLogs |
| Q6b | OUR PATTERN [UNVERIFIED telemetry] | `roller-version.properties` or WEB-INF paths mentioning roller on endpoints | DeviceFileEvents |
| Q6c | OUR PATTERN [UNVERIFIED] | Software inventory entries naming Roller | DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory |

## Sigma rules

All OUR PATTERN, dated 2026-11-17, "Not run against live data."

| Rule | Logsource | Hunt |
|---|---|---|
| `webserver_roller_xmlrpc_post.yml` | webserver | Q1 |
| `proxy_roller_xmlrpc_post.yml` | proxy | Q1 |
| `webserver_roller_xmlrpc_java_serialized.yml` | webserver (keywords) | Q2 |
| `proc_creation_lnx_roller_tomcat_java_shell.yml` | process_creation, linux | Q3 |
| `proc_creation_win_roller_tomcat_java_shell.yml` | process_creation, windows | Q3 |
| `file_event_lnx_roller_jsp_in_webapps.yml` | file_event, linux | Q4 |
| `file_event_win_roller_jsp_in_webapps.yml` | file_event, windows | Q4 |

### Sigma conversion (sigma-cli, pySigma Kusto backend)

`sigma check`: 0 errors, 0 condition errors, 0 issues. Converted for five pipelines into `sigma/converted/`, with 13
documented failures: the three webserver and proxy rules fail on `microsoft_xdr`, `microsoft_365_defender` and
`azure_monitor` ("Unable to determine table name"), and the two webserver rules also fail on `sentinel_asim`
(`cs-uri-stem` is not mapped); use KQL Q1 and Q2 there. The proxy rule converts on `sentinel_asim` (`imWebSession`).
Both process rules fail on `azure_monitor` (`ParentCommandLine` is not mapped); the file rules convert everywhere.

## Checker (offline, read-only)

`scripts/check-roller.sh` (bash) and `scripts/Check-Roller.ps1` (PowerShell 7) give identical output and exit codes.
They open no sockets, write nothing and read only two files under the webapp folder you name:
`WEB-INF/web.xml` and `WEB-INF/classes/roller-version.properties` (the `ro.version` line only). They print the
version number, the XML-RPC servlet and filter names and their URL patterns, and nothing else from the files; values
with unexpected characters are withheld. They never read `roller-custom.properties` or any password.

```
bash scripts/check-roller.sh --webapp <TOMCAT>/webapps/<ROLLER_APP> [--version X.Y.Z]
pwsh -File scripts/Check-Roller.ps1 -Webapp <TOMCAT>/webapps/<ROLLER_APP> [-Version X.Y.Z]
```

`<TOMCAT>` and `<ROLLER_APP>` are placeholders for your own paths. What it reports:

* **Version** from `ro.version` (Roller's Maven builds put `roller-version.properties` in `WEB-INF/classes`; we
  confirmed this in the 5.2.0, 6.1.3, 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 sources). Roller 4.0 built it into `WEB-INF/lib/roller-business.jar` instead;
  for such builds pass `--version`. `--version` is used only when the file gives no plain version number.
* **Range**: CVE-2026-129448 (4.0.0 through 6.1.4), CVE-2026-82384 (6.1.5), fixed (6.1.6 or later), or below 4.0.0
  (not stated by Apache).
* **web.xml**: the XML-RPC servlet (class `org.apache.xmlrpc.webserver.XmlRpcServlet` or name `XmlRpcServlet`), its
  `enabledForExtensions` value (an absent parameter counts as off: the library default is off and the Apache fix
  allows dropping it; any value other than true or false is treated as on, OUR ASSUMPTION), every URL pattern it is
  mapped to (comments are ignored), and whether `XmlRpcEnabledFilter` guards `/roller-services/xmlrpc` (6.1.6).

To check a `.war` file, unpack it into a folder of your choice first, then point `--webapp` at that folder. To read
the version inside a Roller 4.x jar without unpacking it: `unzip -p WEB-INF/lib/roller-business.jar
roller-version.properties`. Both are separate from the checker, which never unpacks or writes anything.

| Exit | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | FIXED: 6.1.6 or later, and the XML-RPC extension types are not switched on |
| 1 | VULNERABLE: 4.0.0 to 6.1.5, `enabledForExtensions` on and the XML-RPC servlet mapped |
| 2 | MITIGATED, UPGRADE NEEDED: 4.0.0 to 6.1.5 with Apache's workaround in place |
| 3 | REVIEW: 6.1.6 or later, but `web.xml` still switches the extension types on with the servlet mapped |
| 4 | UNKNOWN: version not found, not a plain number, or below 4.0.0 |
| 5 | USAGE OR READ ERROR |

## Contents

| Path | What |
|---|---|
| `README.md` | This file |
| `kql/apache-roller-xmlrpc-hunting.kql` | Q1 to Q6c |
| `sigma/*.yml`, `sigma/converted/` | Seven Sigma rules and their Kusto conversions for five pipelines |
| `scripts/check-roller.sh`, `scripts/Check-Roller.ps1` | Offline read-only checkers |
| `tests/` | Bash tests, Pester tests (including bash versus PowerShell parity), synthetic fixtures (marked `FIXTURE_ONLY`), `run_all.sh`, `gates.sh` (static gates), `negative_gates.sh` (plants faults and checks the gates catch them), `kql_parse.ps1`, `sigma_convert.sh` |

## Testing

`tests/run_all.sh` runs shellcheck, PSScriptAnalyzer, the bash tests, the Pester tests, the static gates in
`tests/gates.sh`, the KQL parse check, both checkers inside a bwrap sandbox with no network and a read-only
filesystem (with a sha256 check of the pack before and after), `sigma check` plus a comparison of fresh conversions
with `sigma/converted/` (`REGEN=1` rewrites them), and then `tests/negative_gates.sh`.

Last full run (17 Nov 2026): bash tests 196 passed, Pester 77 passed (including byte-for-byte bash versus
PowerShell parity on every fixture and 21 edge cases), static gates 17 passed, negative gates 50 caught and 0 missed,
sandbox runs 38 passed (18 bash, 18 PowerShell, 2 sandbox checks), KQL 9 hunts with 0 parse errors, Sigma 7 rules
with 0 check issues and 13 documented conversion failures, shellcheck and PSScriptAnalyzer clean.

## ATT&CK mapping (MITRE)

* T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application (Q1, Q2)
* T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.001 PowerShell (Q3)
* T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell (Q4)

## Sources

* CVE-2026-129448 (cve.org): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129448
* CVE-2026-129448 (NVD): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129448
* CVE-2026-82384 (cve.org): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82384
* CVE-2026-82384 (NVD): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82384
* Apache notice, CVE-2026-129448, 17 Nov 2026: https://lists.apache.org/thread/lnz4s26tv6hdo03wngtdbpfj4hg4gtds
* Apache announcement, CVE-2026-82384, 25 Sep 2026: https://lists.apache.org/thread/cc0jck13nb9vvcmzxzwotr6n16mx28z9
* Apache fix, pull request 171: https://github.com/apache/roller/pull/171
* Roller downloads: https://roller.apache.org/downloads/downloads.html
* Apache XML-RPC data types (ex:serializable): https://ws.apache.org/xmlrpc/types.html
* Java Object Serialization Specification, stream protocol: https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/docs/specs/serialization/protocol.html
* CISA KEV catalogue: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
* MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ , https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ , https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/

## Changelog

* 1.0.0 (17 Nov 2026): first version. KQL Q1 to Q6c, seven Sigma rules, offline checkers for version and
  `web.xml`, tests and gates.
