# ConnectWise ScreenConnect partner-account campaign via third-party extensions (November 2026), v1.2.0 with RMM+ and SCKit

CybaVerse threat hunt pack, version 1.2.0. New in 1.2.0: the **SCKit** toolkit (BleepingComputer, 12 Nov 2026, citing security
researchers) and its attempted endpoint-to-technician hop through **CVE-2026-84869**, a ScreenConnect client flaw fixed in
26.6.5 that does not affect ScreenConnect servers. See "SCKit and CVE-2026-84869 (v1.2.0)" below. No successful hop onto a
technician workstation has been observed. Version 1.1.1 added ConnectWise's caveat on Panel-Lateral.ps1 and hunt Q2i; version
1.1.0 added **CVE-2026-127063**, a static default API secret in the third-party **RMM+** extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect
(extension vendor: DataComm). ConnectWise, as CNA, scores CVE-2026-127063 CVSS 4.0 9.3. ScreenConnect server and client
software are not affected by CVE-2026-127063. No fixed RMM+ version has been announced: disable the RMM+ family now.

Versions 1.0.0 (folder `connectwise-screenconnect-extensions-2026-11`), 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 are unchanged. The 1.0.0 text below was
written on 11 Nov 2026 before either CVE was tied to the campaign; where later facts differ, the v1.1.0 and v1.2.0 sections and
the corrected caveats win. All times are UTC (the same as GMT in November). v1.1.0 sources were read on 12 Nov 2026 between
19:02 and 19:06 GMT; v1.2.0 sources at 23:05 GMT. From v1.2.0 this pack cites only BleepingComputer, ConnectWise, NVD, cve.org,
CISA and MITRE; earlier claims that had other press sources are re-sourced to BleepingComputer or dropped (see the changelog).

## CVE-2026-127063 (v1.1.0, verified against primary sources)

| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CNA | ConnectWise | CVE record |
| Affected | vendor DataComm, product RMM+, module "ScreenConnect extension API", versions "All extension versions" (default status unaffected) | CVE record |
| Weakness | CWE-1392, Use of default credentials (CAPEC-70) | CVE record, ConnectWise CNA disclosure |
| Score | ConnectWise (CNA): CVSS 4.0 base score 9.3, CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | CVE record, ConnectWise CNA disclosure |
| CVE published | 12 Nov 2026 17:50 UTC (reserved 13:32 UTC the same day) | CVE record |
| NVD | published 12 Nov 2026 18:17 UTC, status Received; the only metric is ConnectWise's 9.3, listed as Secondary | NVD |
| CNA disclosure | ConnectWise CNA disclosure for CVE-2026-127063 in ConnectWise's public disclosures repository, dated 12 November 2026 (added 17:47 UTC) | ConnectWise CNA disclosure |
| Fixed version | "No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation." | ConnectWise CNA disclosure |
| CISA KEV | not in KEV catalog 2026.11.10 (released 10 Nov 2026 19:03 UTC, the latest at 19:02 GMT on 12 Nov), which predates the CVE | CISA KEV |
| Trust Center | ConnectWise advisory last updated 12 Nov 2026 18:45 UTC, status "Investigation ongoing; protective actions identified"; it says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the independently developed third-party extension | ConnectWise Trust Center |

The CVE record, quoted: "The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default. The
value can be changed by an administrator; however, environments retaining the default value may allow unauthorized access to
extension API functionality, including the ability to send commands to managed agents. This issue is specific to the
third-party extension and does not affect the ScreenConnect server or client."

Scope, quoted from the CVE record: "This issue affects the third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect. Deployments
without the extension are not affected. ScreenConnect server or client software are not impacted."

The ConnectWise CNA disclosure adds: "If the default value is retained, unauthorized requests may be accepted, including requests
to send commands to managed agents." The Trust Center adds that the RMM+ family extensions "provide an API capable of executing
remote commands, protected by a passphrase configured by partners during setup", and that ConnectWise has "found no evidence of a
compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure or that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability".

### What BleepingComputer and the researchers add (not confirmed by ConnectWise)

Source: BleepingComputer, "New worm-like 'SCKit' malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks", 12 Nov 2026 22:53 UTC
(17:53 EST), citing security researchers. It does not name CVE-2026-127063.

- Initial access: BleepingComputer reports researchers believe initial access was through RMM+; tying that to CVE-2026-127063
  is our reading (UNVERIFIED).
- Blank key: researchers report, as relayed in ConnectWise's advisory ("We are assessing these findings") and by BleepingComputer,
  that RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 could accept an empty access key when none had been configured.
- Authentication: BleepingComputer reports the flaw "could allow attackers to execute commands without authenticating to
  ScreenConnect or completing multifactor authentication" (BleepingComputer, citing researchers; no primary source says this).
- No login: BleepingComputer reports commands ran across multiple ScreenConnect instances "without corresponding user login
  activity", with logs linking the commands to RMM+.
- Size: BleepingComputer reports at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations, all targeted within 90 minutes, about a third
  in the first 10 minutes (BleepingComputer, citing an updated researcher report; not ConnectWise's figures).

### ConnectWise's reported indicators (Trust Center, 12 Nov 2026 update)

ConnectWise's advisory now lists reported indicators. It says they "do not establish the initial access method or confirmed root
cause" and that "An absence of matches does not rule out compromise." It repeats the relay and C2 addresses, domains, stager,
client IDs and four file names from the BleepingComputer report (not the c=Exploited tag), and adds:

| Type | Indicator (ConnectWise's reported association) |
|---|---|
| Files | sckit-run.bat (retrieves and executes the malicious loader), sckit-decoder.ps1 (PowerShell decoder and loader), TrapWatch.ps1 (persistent SYSTEM-level execution) |
| Folders | C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, %TEMP%\sckit-* |
| Persistence | scheduled task TrapWatch (as SYSTEM, reportedly every 10 seconds); Run value RelayTrapLiteAlert |
| Accounts | Addmin, rmmserver |
| Domain | ns.mo7sen[.]dev (malicious PowerShell loader delivery) |
| Utility | sqlite3.exe: ConnectWise says it is legitimate and its presence alone is not evidence of compromise (not hunted) |
| Hostnames | 185.99.255[.]28: "Attacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay; hostname screen"; 155.94.150[.]39: "Secondary command-and-control infrastructure; hostname WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1" (hunt Q2i) |

For Panel-Lateral.ps1 ConnectWise lists "Lateral movement component; filename partially visible in the original evidence and requires confirmation". Treat a match on that name
as weaker than the other file names until ConnectWise confirms it.

ConnectWise also says the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique is blocked by the fix for CVE-2026-84869 in
ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 (8 Sep 2026), and asks every partner to verify technician clients run 26.6.5 or later.

## SCKit and CVE-2026-84869 (v1.2.0, verified against primary sources)

### What BleepingComputer reports about SCKit (citing security researchers; not confirmed by ConnectWise)

From "New worm-like 'SCKit' malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks", BleepingComputer, 12 Nov 2026 22:53 UTC (updated
23:01 UTC):

- SCKit is "a collection of 16 scripts and components" built for persistent remote access and to spread between systems
  managed through ScreenConnect.
- The attackers "first deploy additional ScreenConnect Access clients configured to connect to servers under their control".
- RelayTrap "is designed to replace the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest process running on an infected endpoint". It is stored
  "as a C# source code file named RelayTrap.cs" on attacker infrastructure, downloaded to compromised devices, where "a
  PowerShell script compiles it locally into an executable". The source does not name the compiler or the compiled file.
- TrapWatch "monitors ScreenConnect services and prepares the replacement Guest process". ConnectWise lists TrapWatch.ps1 and a
  TrapWatch scheduled task; no other TrapWatch file name is published.
- When a technician connects, RelayTrap "attempts to send a malicious file in the opposite direction of a normal remote-support
  operation, from the infected customer endpoint to the technician's workstation", attempting CVE-2026-84869.
- On a technician workstation, other components would "attempt to steal ScreenConnect authentication cookies from web browsers",
  enumerate accessible endpoints and distribute commands "through legitimate management features, including the platform's
  Shared Toolbox".

### No successful hop onto technicians has been observed

- BleepingComputer: the researchers "have not observed successful exploitation of this flaw during the attacks", and "have not
  seen this worm-like behavior succeeding during the current campaign".
- Reproduced against a current client (BleepingComputer, quoting the researchers): "The Guest side queued the transfer, but the
  current client never requested or ran the payload."
- BleepingComputer, quoting the researchers: "we have no evidence of successful exploitation and no evidence of a bypass at this time."
- BleepingComputer: the console takeover attempt "failed in every recovered host log" one research team examined.
- ConnectWise (Trust Center, 18:45 UTC update): "ConnectWise has verified that client versions 26.6.5 and later block the
  endpoint-to-technician spread technique used by this toolkit. Clients running earlier versions require updating."
- CVE-2026-84869 being in CISA KEV since 11 Sep 2026 is not evidence that the SCKit hop succeeded in this campaign: the KEV
  entry predates the campaign by two months.

### CVE-2026-84869 facts

| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Title | "ScreenConnect Client: Guest-to-Host File Execution via File-Transfer Actions" | CVE record (cve.org) |
| Description | "A condition in the ScreenConnect client may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation in certain circumstances. ScreenConnect servers are not impacted." | CVE record |
| Affects | ScreenConnect clients, "All versions prior to 26.6.5"; servers are not impacted | CVE record; ConnectWise bulletin |
| Fixed | 26.6.5 (8 Sep 2026). CVE record solution: "Upgrade to ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 or later" | CVE record; ConnectWise bulletin |
| CNA score | ConnectWise as CNA: CVSS 3.1 9.9, Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H; NVD shows this CNA score (Secondary) and has no NVD score of its own | CVE record; NVD |
| Bulletin rating | ConnectWise's own bulletin rates it Severity "Important", Priority "1 - High" (not the CVSS label) | ConnectWise bulletin |
| Weakness | CWE-862 Missing Authorization, CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management (MITRE CWE IDs); CAPEC-1 | CVE record |
| Published | CVE record 8 Sep 2026 19:29 UTC; NVD 8 Sep 2026 20:18 UTC, status Analyzed | CVE record; NVD |
| CISA KEV | added 11 Sep 2026, due date 14 Sep 2026; required action cites BOD 26-04; known ransomware use "Unknown" | CISA KEV catalog 2026.11.10 |
| Workaround | until updated, remove the TransferFiles permission from roles (Trust Center: older versions may label it TransferFilesInSession); "not a substitute for installing the security update" | ConnectWise bulletin; Trust Center |

The KEV due date applies to US federal civilian agencies under BOD 26-04. It is not a statement about this campaign.

### SCKit indicators

| Type | Indicator | Label |
|---|---|---|
| File | RelayTrap.cs | NEWS IOC (BleepingComputer, citing security researchers) |
| Files, folders, task, Run value | sckit-run.bat, sckit-decoder.ps1, TrapWatch.ps1, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, %TEMP%\sckit-*, task TrapWatch, value RelayTrapLiteAlert | VENDOR IOC (ConnectWise Trust Center, already in Q2h) |
| Utility | sqlite3.exe, "reportedly abused to access browser-stored session and authentication data; its presence alone is not evidence of compromise" | ConnectWise (context for Q16, not an IOC) |

The Trust Center, re-read at 23:05 GMT (still last updated 18:45 UTC), lists no SCKit indicator beyond those already in this
pack. BleepingComputer publishes no hashes, no compiled RelayTrap name and no other TrapWatch file names; none are invented here.

### ConnectWise advice for SCKit and CVE-2026-84869 (credited to ConnectWise)

From the Trust Center (18:45 UTC update) and the 8 Sep 2026 bulletin:

- "Update every technician client to version 26.6.5 or later." Verify the installed client version on each technician
  workstation; "do not rely on the console version alone". "Updating a cloud console does not automatically update technician
  clients." Keep endpoint access agents current. Bulletin: after upgrading, reinstall host clients and update access agents.
- Reduce file-transfer permissions while updates are pending: disable Transfer Files wherever it is not required (temporary).
- "Do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean affected endpoints. Use EDR response capabilities or another trusted
  out-of-band method. Include technician workstations that connected to affected devices in your assessment."
- From a trusted device, revoke all active ScreenConnect web sessions and associated identity-provider sessions, reset relevant
  credentials and enforce MFA. "Password resets alone do not invalidate all existing sessions."
- Review authentication, extension installation, administrative, Run Command and Toolbox records; after preserving evidence,
  clear queued commands and tools on the server and remove unauthorized software and persistence.

### OUR ADVICE for SCKit (CybaVerse, v1.2.0)

Not ConnectWise guidance.

- **Patch technician clients to 26.6.5 or later**, on every technician workstation, and check it there: run
  `check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --client-inventory` (or the PowerShell twin) on an export of installed client versions.
- **Do not open interactive sessions to suspected-infected endpoints.** Use separate EDR and forensic tooling instead; an
  interactive session is the trigger RelayTrap waits for.
- **Limit Run Command and Shared Toolbox** to the roles that need them, and clear queued commands and Toolbox items you do not
  recognise once evidence is preserved.
- **If a technician connected to an infected host, treat that workstation as suspect:** isolate it with EDR, revoke its
  ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions and browser cookies from a trusted device, and rotate the technician's
  credentials. Hunt it with Q16 and Q17.
- **Hunt** with Q2j, Q12 to Q17 and the v1.2.0 Sigma rules, alongside Q2h and Q14 for rogue Access clients.

## ConnectWise advice for CVE-2026-127063 (credited to ConnectWise)

From the CVE record and the ConnectWise CNA disclosure, quoted:

- Cloud: "No action required. ConnectWise disabled and removed the affected third-party RMM+ extensions from cloud-hosted
  ScreenConnect environments."
- On-premises: "Disable the RMM+ extension immediately and verify that it remains disabled." and "Do not re-enable or reinstall
  it pending further guidance."

The Trust Center (18:45 UTC update) also says: update every technician client to 26.6.5 or later and verify the installed version
on each workstation; reduce Transfer Files permissions while updates are pending; keep the identified extensions disabled
(Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link); from a trusted device revoke all active ScreenConnect
web sessions and associated identity-provider sessions, reset relevant credentials and enforce MFA ("Password resets alone do
not invalidate all existing sessions"); do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean affected endpoints; preserve evidence,
clear queued commands and tools on the server, remove unauthorized software and persistence, and validate before reconnecting.

## OUR ADVICE for CVE-2026-127063 (CybaVerse, v1.1.0)

Not ConnectWise guidance.

- **Inventory and remove the RMM+ family.** Export the Extensions page (name, Active or Inactive, version) and run
  `check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --extension-list`; on on-premises servers also read a copy of App_Extensions with
  `--extensions-dir`. Preserve evidence, then remove, not just disable, any of the five.
- **Rotate strong keys on any extension that uses one.** Any other extension with an API secret, passphrase or access key: set a
  long random value now and record where it is used.
- **Restrict internet access to web and API endpoints.** Put on-premises consoles and extension paths behind a VPN, an allow list
  or a WAF; nobody outside your management networks should reach them.
- **Alert on extension API use.** Q8 and Q8b (IIS, WAF), the new Sigma web rule, and Q9 for commands on many endpoints at once.
- **If you suspect compromise:** do not triage over ScreenConnect; isolate affected endpoints and technician workstations with EDR;
  from a trusted device revoke ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions; reset credentials; then hunt with Q2 to Q2h and Q3
  to Q11.

- ConnectWise advisory: <https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories>, entry "ScreenConnect security advisory:
  Precautionary extension disabling and partner guidance". Published 11 Nov 2026 at 22:45 UTC. Status: "Cause and scope
  under investigation".
- The BleepingComputer report: "Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations",
  <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/>,
  published 11 Nov 2026 at 17:56 EST (22:56 UTC). It cites security researchers for the figures and indicators below.

## What ConnectWise says (verified, credited to ConnectWise)

- ConnectWise "is aware of reports of unauthorized access to ScreenConnect partner accounts and the deployment of
  unauthorized remote-access software in customer environments."
- It "identified five independent 3rd party extensions that may be associated with this activity", found "approximately
  400 partner environments with one or more of these extensions", and "disabled the extensions as a precaution".
- Extensions disabled as a precaution: **Labtech Plus**, **RMM Plus**, **RMM+**, **RMM Plus Password Link**,
  **RMM+ Password Link**.
- On-premises: "If you are an on-premise partner with the below extensions, ConnectWise is unable to take action on your
  behalf. We advise that you take immediate action to disable these extensions."
- "The presence of these 3rd party extensions does not, by itself, establish impact."
- Disabling them "is a precautionary containment measure. It does not establish that unauthorized software, persistence
  mechanisms, or access already present on affected devices has been removed."
- Under investigation: "The initial access method and full scope have not been established." ConnectWise suspects the
  threat actor "deployed additional remote-access software through independent 3rd party extensions". Reports "also
  describe potential compromise of technician workstations during interactive connections to affected devices. These
  reported behaviors remain subject to validation."
- "If you have not deployed these independent 3rd party extensions, we have no reason to believe you are impacted by this
  incident but encourage all partners to be on heightened alert."
- "We will update this advisory as information is validated."

## ConnectWise's precautionary actions (credited to ConnectWise)

For partners who have enabled the extensions, in ConnectWise's words (lightly shortened):

1. **Verify extension status.** Confirm the extensions are disabled. Preserve related installation records and activity
   logs. Do not re-enable or reinstall them pending further guidance.
2. **Investigate suspected compromise through separate security tooling.** Avoid opening interactive ScreenConnect
   sessions to suspected compromised devices; use your security provider's response tools or another trusted method.
3. **Secure administrative access from a trusted device.** Revoke active ScreenConnect and associated identity-provider
   sessions, reset relevant passwords, and verify that multifactor authentication is enforced. If a technician
   workstation may be compromised, use a separate, trusted device.
4. **Review and preserve evidence.** Retain authentication, extension installation, administrative, Run Command, and
   Toolbox records. Investigate unexpected users, permission changes, software deployments, and commands.
5. **Contain and remediate suspected compromise.** Isolate affected devices, including potentially affected technician
   workstations. Preserve evidence before removing malicious software and validate remediation before restoring
   connectivity. "Disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove access already established on
   endpoints."
6. **Verify software maintenance.** Confirm servers, technician clients, and endpoint agents meet current published
   security guidance. "Updating software does not replace investigation and remediation of a suspected compromise."

ConnectWise also points partners to the ScreenConnect hardening guide
(<https://docs.connectwise.com/ScreenConnect_Documentation/Get_started/Security_guide>) and to the instructions for
disabling extensions (<https://docs.connectwise.com/ScreenConnect_Documentation/Get_started/Administration_page/Extensions_page>).
In a statement quoted in the BleepingComputer report, ConnectWise said it is "aware of reports of malicious activity
affecting a limited number of ScreenConnect partners" and that partners "should avoid opening interactive ScreenConnect
sessions to suspected compromised devices".

## What the BleepingComputer report says (citing security researchers; not confirmed by ConnectWise)

- The researchers said the campaign "started around 17:47 UTC today" (11 Nov 2026) "targeting cloud-hosted ScreenConnect
  instances", and that they were tracking 6 compromised MSPs and "286+ endpoints" across 47 organizations, "and those
  numbers are climbing". These figures are the report's, not ConnectWise's.
- Attackers used ScreenConnect's Run Command to deploy ScreenConnect clients on managed endpoints, giving remote access
  outside the legitimate MSP's ScreenConnect environment.
- The researchers warned of a possible reverse pivot onto a technician's workstation when the technician opens a session
  to an infected customer device. The report says it is unclear how this works or whether it uses a software flaw.
- Their telemetry points to compromised credentials and hijacked MSP support sessions; how attackers got in is not
  determined. Sequential attacker tags suggest other MSPs may have been compromised earlier, so check Run Command history
  even without alerts.

### Indicators (the BleepingComputer report, citing security researchers; defanged here)

| Type | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Attacker relay | 185.99.255[.]28 (hostname: screen) |
| C2 domains | newnewnew.gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork.homedns[.]org |
| Possible additional C2 | cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com |
| Secondary C2 | sc.payproofkit[.]com (155.94.150[.]39, hostname: WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) |
| Stager | hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 |
| Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs | 2588ef5c15954b10, ed630cc2c873b091 |
| Installer pattern | /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited&lt;N&gt; |
| Attacker name | Addmin |
| Files | Panel-Lateral.ps1 (ConnectWise: "filename partially visible in the original evidence and requires confirmation"), runnew.cmd, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, Run-Lateral-Full.bat |

When v1.0.0 was written ConnectWise had not published indicators. Its advisory now lists most of them as reported indicators
(see the v1.1.0 section). The KQL, Sigma and checkers use these literally.

## Our advice (OUR ADVICE, CybaVerse)

Not ConnectWise guidance.

1. **Do ConnectWise's six steps now.** There is no patch to wait for.
2. **Find every ScreenConnect client that points at an instance that is not yours.** Each client service carries the relay
   host in h=. A client pointing at someone else's instance is remote access for them. Use Q1, Q1b, Q4 and Q4c, and on
   Windows run `Check-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1 --local --expected-host <your relay host>`.
3. **Restrict who can use Run Command and Toolbox.** Remove the permissions from roles that do not need them (ScreenConnect
   role-based permissions on the Security page) and review queued commands and Toolbox items. The hardening guide lists the
   Security Toolkit extension, which can delete all queued commands and toolbox items.
4. **List installed extensions on on-premises servers** and disable any of the five (Administration, Extensions, Options,
   Disable). Record what you find before changing anything. The checker reads names only; it does not change state.
5. **Hunt for the reported indicators** (Q2 to Q2g, Sigma IOC rules) and for the behaviour behind them (Q3 to Q7): shells
   from ScreenConnect clients, new client services, Toolbox writes, and new users. Treat "Addmin" as a user name to look
   for in Windows, your identity provider and the ScreenConnect audit log.
6. **Treat technician workstations as possibly exposed** until the reverse pivot is understood: review them with EDR, and
   rotate credentials from a separate trusted device.
7. **Keep the ScreenConnect audit log and session recordings** (the server's SQLite database and extended auditing) before
   any cleanup.

## What is in this pack

| Path | What |
|---|---|
| `kql/connectwise-screenconnect-extensions-2026-11-hunting.kql` | 36 queries: Q1 to Q1e INVENTORY, Q2 to Q2g IOC, Q2h and Q2i IOC (ConnectWise advisory), Q2j NEWS IOC (BleepingComputer), Q3 to Q17 OUR PATTERN (Q8 to Q11 new in v1.1.0, Q12 to Q17 new in v1.2.0) |
| `sigma/*.yml` | 14 rules (4 IOC, 1 VENDOR IOC, 1 NEWS IOC, 8 OUR PATTERN); Kusto conversions in `sigma/converted/` |
| `scripts/check-screenconnect-extensions.sh` | Bash checker for exports or copied folders (Linux, macOS) |
| `scripts/Check-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1` | PowerShell 7 twin, plus `--local` on Windows |
| `tests/` | bash tests, Pester tests with parity, fixtures, KQL parse check, `run_all.sh` |

### Hunts

INVENTORY: Q1 client services seen running (h=, p=, client ID); Q1b client services from the registry ImagePath (k= and v=
masked); Q1c software inventory; Q1d client network destinations; Q1e App_Extensions folders on on-premises servers.

IOC (the BleepingComputer report): Q2 network (Defender); Q2b network (CommonSecurityLog); Q2c DNS (DnsEvents); Q2d file
names; Q2e process command lines (client IDs, hosts, stager, files, c=Exploited); Q2f client services for the rogue IDs
or IOC hosts; Q2g the "Addmin" account.

OUR PATTERN: Q3 shells and script hosts from ScreenConnect clients (Run Command); Q3b a ScreenConnect client installing
another client with a relay that is not yours; Q4 client services pointing at a relay not in ExpectedHosts; Q4b System
event 7045 for new ScreenConnect services (Sentinel); Q4c devices with more than one client ID or a new one; Q5 files
written by ScreenConnect clients (Toolbox and transfers); Q6 users created or added to groups from a ScreenConnect process
tree; Q6b SecurityEvent 4720, 4728, 4732, 4756; Q6c changes under App_Extensions and App_Data on the server; Q7 activity
under the ScreenConnect client on named technician workstations.

New in v1.1.0: Q2h IOC (ConnectWise advisory) the SCKit files, RelayTrap folder, TrapWatch task, RelayTrapLiteAlert value and the
Addmin and rmmserver accounts; Q8 OUR PATTERN extension path requests with no technician sign-in from the same address in the hour
before (W3CIISLog; extension and login paths UNVERIFIED); Q8b OUR PATTERN extension path requests at a WAF, proxy or firewall
(CommonSecurityLog); Q9 OUR PATTERN the same command shape from ScreenConnect client processes on many devices within 90 minutes;
Q10 OUR PATTERN new .ps1, .bat or .cmd files written by ScreenConnect client processes, never seen before by name or hash; Q11 OUR
PATTERN client processes talking to hosts that are not your relays, with Q2 indicators marked, and unknown client IDs.

New in v1.1.1: Q2i IOC (ConnectWise advisory), VENDOR IOC, the hostnames "screen" (185.99.255[.]28) and WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1
(155.94.150[.]39) as remote device names on logons (DeviceLogonEvents) and remote names on network events (DeviceNetworkEvents).
LOW FIDELITY for "screen": it is a generic name, so Q2i matches it only together with its IP. UNVERIFIED: that these names
surface in those fields.

New in v1.2.0 (SCKit):
- Q2j NEWS IOC (BleepingComputer): RelayTrap.cs written to disk or named in a command line.
- Q12 OUR PATTERN: PowerShell starting csc.exe, or compiling a .cs file, marked when the device has RelayTrap.cs or RelayTrap
  folder activity or the command line names RelayTrap. csc.exe is NOT in the sources (UNVERIFIED for SCKit).
- Q13 OUR PATTERN: a ScreenConnect client process image that looks replaced: outside a "ScreenConnect Client (<id>)" folder,
  written by PowerShell or csc.exe, or unsigned, untrusted or not signed by a signer in ExpectedSigners
  (DeviceFileCertificateInfo; schema assumed, UNVERIFIED).
- Q14 OUR PATTERN: devices with more than one ScreenConnect Client service, or a relay host (h=) not in RelayAllowlist.
- Q15 OUR PATTERN: Run Command or Toolbox activity on endpoints with no technician sign-in in the same or previous hour
  (endpoint signals as in Q3 and Q5, sign-ins from W3CIISLog as in Q8; all table assumptions UNVERIFIED; cloud instances need
  the ScreenConnect audit records instead).
- Q16 OUR PATTERN: on technician workstations, non-browser processes (or sqlite3.exe) touching browser cookie stores within two
  hours of a ScreenConnect client running.
- Q17 OUR PATTERN: on technician workstations, files written by a ScreenConnect client process and run within an hour (the
  CVE-2026-84869 direction).

### Sigma

| Rule | Label | Kusto conversion |
|---|---|---|
| `proc_creation_win_screenconnect_client_spawns_shell.yml` | OUR PATTERN | all pipelines |
| `registry_set_win_screenconnect_client_service_imagepath.yml` | OUR PATTERN | all but azure_monitor (no registry table) |
| `win_system_screenconnect_client_service_installed.yml` | OUR PATTERN | no pipeline only (use Q4b) |
| `proc_creation_win_screenconnect_campaign_installer_ioc.yml` | IOC | all pipelines |
| `file_event_win_screenconnect_campaign_filenames.yml` | IOC | all pipelines |
| `net_connection_win_screenconnect_campaign_ips.yml` | IOC | all pipelines |
| `dns_query_win_screenconnect_campaign_domains.yml` | IOC | no pipeline only (use Q2c) |
| `file_event_win_screenconnect_sckit_indicators.yml` (v1.1.0) | VENDOR IOC (ConnectWise advisory) | all pipelines |
| `webserver_screenconnect_extension_api_request.yml` (v1.1.0) | OUR PATTERN | no pipeline only (use Q8 and Q8b) |
| `file_event_win_screenconnect_client_writes_script.yml` (v1.1.0) | OUR PATTERN | all pipelines |
| `net_connection_win_screenconnect_client_unknown_relay.yml` (v1.1.0) | OUR PATTERN | all pipelines |
| `file_event_win_sckit_relaytrap_source.yml` (v1.2.0) | NEWS IOC (BleepingComputer) | all pipelines |
| `proc_creation_win_powershell_spawns_csc.yml` (v1.2.0) | OUR PATTERN, low (csc.exe not in the sources) | all pipelines |
| `proc_creation_win_non_browser_cookie_store_access.yml` (v1.2.0) | OUR PATTERN | all pipelines |

The three OUR PATTERN rules with `REPLACE-WITH-YOUR-RELAY-HOST` need your relay host before use.

### Checkers (read-only)

```
bash scripts/check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --extension-list extensions.txt     # v1.1.0: Name|State|Version per line
bash scripts/check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --extensions-dir <App_Extensions copy> --clients <services.txt> \
  --expected-host instance-xxxx-relay.screenconnect.com --files-root <folder>
pwsh -File scripts/Check-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1 --local --expected-host instance-xxxx-relay.screenconnect.com
bash scripts/check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --client-inventory clients.txt --expected-host instance-xxxx-relay.screenconnect.com
```

- `--client-inventory` (v1.2.0): the installed ScreenConnect clients on ONE machine, one per line as `Version|ServiceLine`, where
  ServiceLine (service name and ImagePath, as for `--clients`) is optional; a technician host client has none. Each version is
  compared with 26.6.5: below it is OUTDATED CLIENT (CVE-2026-84869), three or four dot separated numbers are required, anything
  else is UNKNOWN. It counts ScreenConnect Client services (more than one is REVIEW, MULTIPLE CLIENTS) and lists their relay
  hosts (h=); with `--expected-host`, other hosts are REVIEW, UNEXPECTED HOST. It prints only the version, the count and the
  relay host: never keys, client IDs, ports, paths or other parameters. New exit code 6 OUTDATED CLIENT (a client below 26.6.5
  and no findings); it ranks below 1 FINDINGS and above 5 REVIEW and 3 UNKNOWN.

- `--extension-list` (v1.1.0): an operator-supplied listing, one extension per line as `Name`, `Name|State` or
  `Name|State|Version` (tab also separates). For the five RMM+ family names (exact, case-insensitive): State Active or Enabled is
  VULNERABLE (exit 1), Inactive or Disabled is DISABLED (exit 5, review), Removed or Uninstalled is REMOVED (exit 0), anything
  else UNKNOWN (exit 3). Near matches are REVIEW. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 add a note on the researchers' blank-key report.
  Matching is by name only; the pack invents no extension GUIDs or folder names.
- `--extensions-dir`: lists each extension folder's Manifest.xml Name (and Author) and flags the five names ConnectWise
  lists (exact, case-insensitive), with near matches as REVIEW. It does not read whether an extension is enabled; check
  the Extensions page (disabled extensions sit in the Inactive section).
- `--clients`: one line per client service (for example `Name|PathName` from `Get-CimInstance Win32_Service`). Flags the
  rogue client IDs, IOC hosts and `c=Exploited` tags from the report, and relay hosts not in `--expected-host`. k=, v= and
  s= are never printed.
- `--files-root`: looks for the four reported file names and, from v1.1.0, ConnectWise's sckit-run.bat, sckit-decoder.ps1 and
  TrapWatch.ps1 (12 levels, symlinks not followed).
- `--local` (PowerShell on Windows only): reads `HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ScreenConnect Client (*)` and the
  default `App_Extensions` folder, read-only.
- No network, no writes, nothing executed. Give it exports or copies rather than live server folders. Exit: 0 NO FINDINGS, 1
  FINDINGS (including VULNERABLE), 6 OUTDATED CLIENT (v1.2.0), 5 REVIEW (including DISABLED), 3 UNKNOWN, 4 usage or read error.

UNVERIFIED: where ScreenConnect stores extensions on disk (`App_Extensions\<GUID>\Manifest.xml` with a `<Name>` element),
the client service name `ScreenConnect Client (<16 hex>)`, the ImagePath parameters (h=, p=, k=, s=, c=) and the Run
Command script location under `Windows\Temp\ScreenConnect` are as commonly observed on installations. ConnectWise's
Extensions page documentation covers the web console (enable, disable, uninstall) but not the on-disk layout. Current
on-premises ScreenConnect servers run on Windows (Linux server support appears to have ended; UNVERIFIED), so the bash
checker is for exports and copied folders rather than a live Linux server.

## Unverified and context

- v1.2.0: csc.exe (Q12, Sigma) is not named by BleepingComputer or ConnectWise; the sources say only that a PowerShell script
  compiles RelayTrap.cs. The compiled RelayTrap file name, the Guest process image RelayTrap uses, and any TrapWatch binary are
  not published, so Q13 looks for anomalies instead of names.
- v1.2.0: DeviceFileCertificateInfo columns (Q13), browser cookie store and browser process names (Q16) and the Q15 mapping of
  Run Command and Toolbox activity to endpoint telemetry are assumptions, not from the sources.
- v1.2.0: that RelayTrap's file push would show as a file written by a ScreenConnect client process on the technician side (Q17).
- v1.2.0: the 16 components and the 288 endpoints and 48 organizations are BleepingComputer's figures, citing researchers.
- v1.1.0: that the flaw BleepingComputer describes (blank key in 1.0.31 and 1.0.32) is the same issue as CVE-2026-127063
  (static default secret). ConnectWise assigned the CVE and is "assessing" the blank-key findings.
- v1.1.0: the URL paths Q8, Q8b and the web Sigma rule use for extension requests (/App_Extensions/) and technician sign-ins
  (/Login), and that IIS logs reach W3CIISLog. Check them against your own logs.
- v1.1.0: the ScreenConnect client process names (ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe) and the client
  folder name used by Q9 to Q11 are the ones v1.0.0 already used, as commonly observed; still UNVERIFIED against ConnectWise
  documentation.
- v1.1.0: which RMM+ versions exist and whether a fix is coming. ConnectWise: no fixed RMM+ version has been announced. The CVE
  record lists all extension versions as affected.

- The reverse pivot onto technician workstations: in v1.0.0 ConnectWise said "subject to validation" and the 11 Nov report said
  the method was unclear. v1.2.0 update: BleepingComputer (12 Nov) ties it to CVE-2026-84869 and reports no successful hop;
  ConnectWise says clients 26.6.5 and later block it.
- The role of the five extensions: ConnectWise says they "may be associated" and that it "suspect[s]" their use.
- `cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com` is listed only as "possible additional C2". The report's later paragraph refers to
  "digitaldownloads[.]com" as the listed potential IOC; we use the full name from the indicator list.
- BleepingComputer separately found a July 2026 batch file (SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat) that checks for client ID
  ed630cc2c873b091 and contacted amexsafekeyupdate[.]com, with sandbox downloads from cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com and
  cyberrexdesign.screenconnect[.]com. The report says it is unclear whether that activity and this campaign are linked.
  These three items are not in the indicator list and are **not** used as campaign IOCs in this pack.
- Hostnames "screen" and "WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1" are as reported; we have not checked them.
- The "Exploited" tag: the report gives `&c=Exploited<N>`; the checkers match any c= value starting "exploited".

## Caveats

- The KQL in this pack has NOT been run against a live tenant. It parses offline with Kusto.Language against an assumed
  schema subset. Tune before relying on it.
- v1.1.0 correction: v1.0.0 said there was no CVE. CVE-2026-127063 now covers the RMM+ extension.
  ConnectWise as CNA scores it CVSS 4.0 9.3. ScreenConnect itself has no new CVE for this campaign; SCKit tries an older,
  fixed client flaw (CVE-2026-84869). No fixed RMM+ version has been announced: disable and remove the RMM+ family.
- v1.2.0: v1.0.0 framed the campaign's severity by its impact; that framing is withdrawn. The only CVSS labels used are the CNA
  ratings: 9.3 for CVE-2026-127063 and 9.9 for CVE-2026-84869 (which ConnectWise's bulletin rates Important).
- CISA KEV dates apply to US federal agencies only (BOD 26-04). Not being in KEV is not a statement about exploitation. Act now
  regardless.
- Indicators come from BleepingComputer reports citing researchers, and ConnectWise now lists most of them as reported indicators
  that do not establish root cause. IPs can be reassigned.
- A name match on an extension or file proves nothing by itself; ConnectWise says the extensions' presence does not
  establish impact.

## Advisory state at finish

Rechecked 11 Nov 2026 at 23:25 UTC: the ConnectWise advisory text is unchanged since it was first read at 23:05 GMT.
Published 11 Nov 2026 at 22:45 UTC, status "Cause and scope under investigation", no update entries. ConnectWise says it
will update the advisory as information is validated; check it again before acting on this pack. The BleepingComputer page
could not be refetched at 23:25 UTC (bot check); the indicators above are from the copy read at 23:05 GMT.

## Advisory state at finish (v1.1.0)

Read 12 Nov 2026 between 19:02 and 19:06 GMT: ConnectWise advisory last updated 18:45 UTC, status "Investigation ongoing;
protective actions identified"; the CVE record and the ConnectWise CNA disclosure as quoted above; NVD status Received; KEV
catalog 2026.11.10 without the CVE. Check them again before acting on this pack.

## Advisory state at finish (v1.2.0)

Read 12 Nov 2026 at 23:05 GMT: ConnectWise Trust Center advisory still last updated 18:45 UTC, status "Investigation ongoing;
protective actions identified", no SCKit indicators beyond those in this pack; BleepingComputer SCKit article published 22:53 UTC,
updated 23:01 UTC; CVE-2026-84869 record last updated 12 Sep 2026; NVD status Analyzed; KEV catalog 2026.11.10 (dateAdded
11 Sep 2026, due 14 Sep 2026). Check them again before acting on this pack.

## Sources (v1.2.0)

- BleepingComputer, "New worm-like 'SCKit' malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks" (12 Nov 2026):
  https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-worm-like-sckit-malware-targets-msps-in-screenconnect-attacks/
- ConnectWise security bulletin, ScreenConnect 26.6.5 Security Patch (8 Sep 2026):
  https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin
- CVE record: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-84869
- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84869
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- CISA BOD 26-04: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- MITRE CWE-862 and CWE-269: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html, https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html
- ConnectWise Trust Center advisory: https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories

## Sources (v1.1.0)

- CVE record: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127063
- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-127063
- ConnectWise CNA disclosure for CVE-2026-127063 (ConnectWise's public disclosures repository, linked from the CVE record)
- ConnectWise Trust Center advisory: https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories
- ConnectWise partner guidance (11 Nov 2026): https://www.connectwise.com/blog/screenconnect-security-update-guidance-for-partners
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- From v1.2.0, the two other press articles v1.1.0 cited are no longer cited; their claims are re-sourced to BleepingComputer
  above or dropped (see the 1.2.0 changelog entry).

## Changelog

- 1.2.0 (12 Nov 2026): adds SCKit and CVE-2026-84869 (BleepingComputer 12 Nov 2026 22:53 UTC; ConnectWise bulletin of 8 Sep
  2026; cve.org; NVD; CISA KEV). New KQL Q2j (NEWS IOC) and Q12 to Q17 (OUR PATTERN); three Sigma rules (one NEWS IOC, two OUR
  PATTERN); `--client-inventory` in both checkers (client version against 26.6.5, ScreenConnect Client service count and relay
  hosts) with new exit code 6 OUTDATED CLIENT; SCKit section with ConnectWise advice versus ours. Corrections: citations limited
  to BleepingComputer, ConnectWise, NVD, cve.org, CISA and MITRE, so the other press citations are re-sourced to BleepingComputer
  and the "six MSPs" figure (only in those articles) is dropped; the CVSS label is used only for ConnectWise's CNA 9.9 for CVE-2026-84869,
  noting ConnectWise's bulletin rates it Important; checker notes now say "BleepingComputer" instead of "the press". Gates
  for the new content. Panel-Lateral caveat and Q2i kept.
- 1.1.1 (12 Nov 2026): adds ConnectWise's Trust Center caveat for Panel-Lateral.ps1 ("filename partially visible in the
  original evidence and requires confirmation") to the README, the Q2d and Q2e hunts, the Sigma filename rule and both checkers
  (comments only); new KQL hunt Q2i for the hostnames "screen" (low fidelity, only with 185.99.255[.]28) and WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1;
  gates for both. Trust Center re-read 12 Nov 2026 19:55 GMT (last updated 18:45 UTC). Checker verdicts unchanged.
- 1.1.0 (12 Nov 2026): adds CVE-2026-127063 (RMM+ extension, static default API secret, ConnectWise CNA 9.3). New `--extension-list`
  mode in both checkers (VULNERABLE, DISABLED, REMOVED, UNKNOWN), ConnectWise's SCKit file indicators in `--files-root`, KQL
  Q2h and Q8 to Q11, four Sigma rules, updated advisory, IOC and severity text, corrected caveats, and an `app_ext_empty`
  fixture that survives copies which drop empty folders.
- 1.0.0 (11 Nov 2026): first release, before the CVE.
