CriticalSupply chainSSH backdoorCursor and VS Code

Did the trojanised Claude Code extension 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 reach your machines?

Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 were malicious copies of the Claude Code extension, not built by Anthropic, served by Cursor's VS Code extension marketplace between about 09:27 and 20:35 GMT on 29 October 2026. They add an attacker SSH key labelled svc-telemetry, install persistence and send host details out. Cursor later corrected the package hashes and confirmed both versions. Update to 2.1.314 or later, then check every machine for the key.

No CVE: a marketplace supply-chain compromise

There is no CVE or CVSS score because no product flaw was exploited. A malicious package was served through Cursor's marketplace. CybaVerse rates it Critical. Cursor's 13 November incident update says at most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions on 29 October potentially received the malicious build, and that Cursor will contact them directly. Removing the extension alone does not remove the backdoor.

At a Glance

Based on Cursor's revised 30 October security notice, Cursor's 13 November incident update and Microsoft's 30 October blog. Last updated 18 November 2026, 18:35 GMT.

09:27 GMT, 29 Oct

Malicious Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 become available in Cursor's VS Code extension marketplace.

20:35 GMT, 29 Oct

The exposure window ends. Cursor removes the versions, shuts the marketplace down and has the attacker server taken offline.

18:30 GMT, 30 Oct

Cursor revises its notice: both versions, corrected hashes and Linux indicators. 2.1.314 is already on Open VSX (01:07 GMT). Microsoft publishes its blog the same day.

13 Nov

Cursor's incident update says at most 5,000 users were potentially affected, Open VSX never had the malware, and the last attacker activity it has seen, on 1 November, was blocked.

What the malicious extension does

  • Collects host details: hostname, username, OS and architecture, home and working directories, the global Git email, the public IP and environment variable names (Cursor). Public reporting adds that it takes up to 40 names matching KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, PASS, AWS or GCP, and not their values.
  • Plants a backdoor: adds an attacker SSH key labelled svc-telemetry to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, tries to enable the local SSH service and opens a reverse SSH tunnel to 134.209.82.225.
  • Persists (per Cursor): on macOS, the LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond with ~/.config/.smt and .smtk. On Windows, the scheduled task SysMon (trying to run as SYSTEM) with smt.cmd and a Startup fallback sysmon.cmd. On Linux, a crontab entry @reboot /bin/sh "<HOME>/.config/.smt" and /tmp/.stk_<10 hex>, added in Cursor's 30 October revision. Background scripts retry the tunnel about every 60 seconds.
  • Beacons: sends host details and backdoor status by HTTP POST to 134.209.82.225:8099/beacon.

Cursor says the tunnel step would fail for two reasons: enabling SSH needs admin rights, which the extension does not have on most macOS and Windows hosts, and bugs in the malicious code break it unless Cursor was started as an administrator. Where it failed, the attacker could not log in. The key, the persistence and the beacon still ran, so every affected machine needs cleaning.

Hash correction (30 October)

Cursor's first notice listed only 2.1.313, with darwin-arm64 SHA-256 432ccdee3801f99e52b8fe31f69ea9870118e96ea7ef9ecabed1479621b5ab62 and win32-x64 SHA-256 3de1722901165769893bef57c72594e9a54459faa23f3091b136b79966edd081. In the 30 October revision, 3de17229... is listed under 2.1.312 win32-x64, 2.1.313 has new hashes, and 432ccdee... is no longer listed. Treat 432ccdee... as a withdrawn, low-confidence lead only. A genuine 2.1.312 exists on Open VSX, so a 2.1.312 folder under Cursor with no payload indicator needs its hash and install time checked, not an automatic compromise verdict.

What to Do in the Next 24 Hours

Vendor advice and our advice are labelled separately. Tick both tracks.

Proactive: Find Exposure and Lock Down

Work out which machines received 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from Cursor's marketplace, update them and stop extensions arriving unchecked again.

Free Detection Pack

Built by the CybaVerse threat hunt team for businesses, internal IT teams and MSPs. Version 1.1.0 covers 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 with the corrected hashes. Everything is read-only.

Verdicts

  • CLEANNo 2.1.313 install, no confirmed-malicious 2.1.312, and none of the indicators found in the locations checked.
  • INDICATORS FOUNDA 2.1.313 folder is present, a 2.1.312 folder matches a published malicious hash or payload indicator, or the svc-telemetry key, a payload file, persistence or a tunnel to the attacker IP was found.
  • REVIEWA 2.1.312 folder was found under Cursor with no payload indicator in extension.js. A genuine 2.1.312 exists on Open VSX, so check the install time and VSIX hash.
  • UNKNOWNA location could not be read. Re-run as root or elevated.

Exit codes

CodeMeaning
0CLEAN
1INDICATORS FOUND
2UNKNOWN
3Error, such as bad arguments or a missing path
4REVIEW (2.1.312 under Cursor with no payload indicator)

Precedence is INDICATORS FOUND, then REVIEW, then UNKNOWN, then CLEAN. Businesses and MSPs can use the exit code in RMM or scheduled jobs to flag machines at scale.

Know the limits

  • Both checkers are read-only and offline. They never connect to the attacker IP or anywhere else, never remove keys, tasks, cron entries or LaunchAgents, and never run Cursor's removal scripts.
  • Linux crontab checks now use Cursor's published indicators from the 30 October revision, including the @reboot entry.
  • Hashed known_hosts entries are not checked.
  • The KQL has not been run against a live tenant. Check the field names against your connectors before relying on an empty result.

Reactive: How to Hunt

Hunt every machine that ran 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from Cursor's marketplace, from 29 October onwards. CybaOps can run these hunts across your estate or your clients'.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicator
Network (Cursor)Attacker host 134.209.82.225. Reverse SSH as tunnel@134.209.82.225 on TCP 22. HTTP POST beacon to http://134.209.82.225:8099/beacon, plus a loopback attempt to 127.0.0.1:8099/beacon. Lookups to ifconfig.me or api.ipify.org are legitimate services and not an indicator on their own.
SSH key (Cursor)Comment svc-telemetry. Fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk. Reverse-tunnel key fingerprint SHA256:KOAU57+ZG6u3MG4WwzPzPX2O5YEe9qdOC1Bl+6MVyDQ.
Linux and macOS files (Cursor)Unauthorised key in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. ~/.config/.smt and ~/.config/.smtk. Linux: /tmp/.stk_<10 hex> and cron @reboot /bin/sh "<HOME>/.config/.smt". macOS: $TMPDIR/.stk_<10 hex> and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist (label com.apple.sysmond).
Windows files (Cursor)%USERPROFILE%\.ssh\authorized_keys, %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd, %USERPROFILE%\.config\smtk, %TEMP%\.stk_<10 hex>, scheduled task SysMon and the fallback Startup\sysmon.cmd in the user's Start Menu. Cursor's Windows check also reads C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys.
Processes (Cursor)ssh -N -R '*:0:localhost:22' or autossh -M 0 with StrictHostKeyChecking=no and UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null, schtasks /create /tn SysMon, systemsetup -setremotelogin on and Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name OpenSSH.Server.
Package 2.1.312 (Cursor, revised notice)darwin-arm64 VSIX SHA-256 fcbb327e38e61c4fec795e0d0591f52cd1014b813d20a5912104953c3a17c364 (MD5 e0d64d53e802a0217ba6f0e656ed2f20). win32-x64 VSIX SHA-256 3de1722901165769893bef57c72594e9a54459faa23f3091b136b79966edd081 (MD5 bd3b71ddf3d0cc3af76249afd2c0eda1).
Package 2.1.313 (Cursor, revised notice)darwin-arm64 VSIX SHA-256 80402fdcad8799285fd93044976973ca000da7995fb93363f819bb8e4f84ee6c (MD5 34e491161e056c9b899a79b602ac73b9). win32-x64 VSIX SHA-256 6786ec90cbd45949695bd7805c9fbb26cfc91bc5fc897de0183d9bcb9cb21731 (MD5 7838a3be2ca0ff08c1bdb160ef516d39).
Payload (Cursor; Microsoft lists the same SHA-256)extension.js in 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Darwin and Windows contains the attacker IP and svc-telemetry. SHA-256 ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15 (MD5 f49bcd657ef1e626e85ce858958c1769).
Tunnel key file (Microsoft only)Decoded tunnel private-key file SHA-256 7e0a52885fadee05544a9e99eb18c792bec05900a5e1a66d68f8383decb0e278. Do not print the key material.
Withdrawn hash (low confidence)SHA-256 432ccdee3801f99e52b8fe31f69ea9870118e96ea7ef9ecabed1479621b5ab62 was listed as 2.1.313 darwin-arm64 in Cursor's first notice and is no longer in the revised notice. Keep it only as a withdrawn lead, not as a confirmed current hash for 2.1.313.

If you find something

  • Isolate the machine and preserve evidence: authorized_keys, the persistence files, process lists, and shell, EDR and network logs.
  • Remove the key, persistence and tunnel processes with Cursor's removal scripts from its security notice: remediate-macos.sh as the affected user (not root) and remediate-windows.ps1 from PowerShell run as Administrator. They exit non-zero if anything remains. Cursor has published no Linux script, so on Linux remove the key, the @reboot crontab entry, the files and tunnel processes by hand and record what you removed.
  • Uninstalling the extension is not enough, because the payload drops standalone scripts that keep running.
  • Consider rebuilding the machine, especially if SSH was enabled.
  • From a trusted machine, rotate the credentials and sessions reachable from the affected one: cloud keys, CI and Git tokens, SSH keys and browser sessions.

Updated does not mean clean

Version 2.1.314 removes the malicious code from the extension, but it does not remove the SSH key, the LaunchAgent, scheduled task or crontab entry, or a running tunnel. Every machine that ran a malicious 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 should be hunted, not just updated.

Claude Code Extension 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 FAQ

Short answers based on Cursor's revised notice, Cursor's 13 November incident update and Microsoft's blog. Last updated 18 November 2026, 18:35 GMT.

Am I affected?

Only if a machine installed or updated to Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from Cursor's VS Code extension marketplace between about 09:27 and 20:35 GMT on 29 October 2026. Cursor's 13 November incident update says at most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions on 29 October potentially received the malicious build, and that Cursor will contact affected customers directly. A genuine 2.1.312 exists on Open VSX, so confirm the package hash, not only the version number. The quickest test is to look for the svc-telemetry key in authorized_keys.

Was the extension made by Anthropic?

No. Cursor says the malicious versions were not developed by Anthropic. They were modified copies of the Claude Code extension that appeared in Cursor's marketplace. Microsoft, as the Visual Studio Marketplace operator, says the malicious packages were never published on the Visual Studio Marketplace or on npm, and that Anthropic confirmed to Microsoft that Anthropic's systems were not compromised. Cursor says it has no evidence that other versions or the official distribution are affected.

Is there a CVE or CVSS score?

No. This is a supply-chain compromise of a marketplace, not a flaw in a product, so there is no CVE and no CVSS score. CybaVerse rates it Critical because it plants an SSH backdoor and persistence on developer machines.

Cursor first listed only 2.1.313. What changed?

Cursor's first notice listed only 2.1.313, with darwin-arm64 SHA-256 432ccdee3801f99e52b8fe31f69ea9870118e96ea7ef9ecabed1479621b5ab62 and win32-x64 SHA-256 3de1722901165769893bef57c72594e9a54459faa23f3091b136b79966edd081. In the 30 October revision, published at 18:30 GMT, Cursor added 2.1.312, moved 3de17229... to 2.1.312 win32-x64, published new hashes for 2.1.313, and no longer lists 432ccdee.... Treat 432ccdee... as a withdrawn, low-confidence lead only. Hunt both versions with the revised hashes.

Could auto-update have installed it without anyone noticing?

Yes, that is possible. Public reporting, not Cursor, notes that anyone with the extension set to auto-update during the window could have received it without doing anything. Check every machine where Cursor or VS Code pulled extensions from Cursor's marketplace on 29 October, not only people who installed it by hand.

Did the attacker actually get into machines?

Probably not on most, but you cannot assume that. Cursor says turning on the local SSH service needs admin rights, which the extension does not have on most macOS and Windows hosts, and that bugs in the malicious code make the step fail unless Cursor was started as an administrator. Where it failed, the attacker could not log in through the tunnel. The extension still added the SSH key, installed persistence and sent host details, so follow the clean-up steps either way.

What data was taken?

Cursor says the payload collected the hostname, username, operating system, architecture, home and working directories, environment variable names, the configured Git email and the public IP. Public reporting adds that it took up to 40 variable names matching KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, PASS, AWS or GCP, without their values. Those names can still reveal which cloud and CI services you use.

Is updating to 2.1.314 enough?

No. Updating or uninstalling removes the extension, but the payload drops standalone persistence scripts that keep running. Remove the SSH key, the persistence and any tunnel process with Cursor's removal scripts (remediate-macos.sh, or remediate-windows.ps1 run as Administrator), then rotate credentials. There is no Cursor script for Linux, so clean Linux machines by hand.

Is the attacker's server still live?

No. Cursor says it worked with the hosting provider to take the server offline, so the reverse tunnel and beacon no longer work. Cursor's 13 November incident update says the last attacker activity it has seen was on 1 November, and that it was blocked. Block the IP anyway, as persistence on an affected host keeps retrying about every 60 seconds.

Were other extensions or Open VSX affected?

Cursor says it audited access and confirmed no other extensions were tampered with. Cursor's 13 November incident update says the marketplace source, Open VSX, never had the malware. Open VSX published a genuine 2.1.312 on 27 October at 20:26 GMT and 2.1.314 on 30 October at 01:07 GMT. 2.1.313 was never published there. Microsoft says the malicious packages were never published on the Visual Studio Marketplace or on npm. Cursor removed the malicious versions, shut the marketplace down, rotated its keys, rebuilt the marketplace and brought it back online.

We are an MSP or manage many developer machines. Where do we start?

Use your RMM or EDR to list every device with anthropic.claude-code 2.1.313, or 2.1.312 under Cursor folders, in its extensions directory, and every device with svc-telemetry in authorized_keys. Confirm 2.1.312 against the published hashes, because a genuine 2.1.312 exists on Open VSX. Block the attacker IP across all client firewalls, then isolate and clean any device where the key, a matching hash or persistence is found.

Protect Your Developers, and Your Clients'

CybaOps monitors your endpoints, servers and cloud workloads, whether that's your own business or your clients'. UK-based analysts monitor alerts 24/7, run these threat hunts and act on pre-approved response actions, and CybaOps drives remediation through to a verified fix, so proactive checks and reactive response happen in one place.