Have you checked every Optimizely snippet your sites load?
On 16 November 2026 an attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Websites that loaded those snippets, including CNN, the BBC, Zoom and Optimizely's own site, served visitors a loader that could swap cryptocurrency addresses, capture payment-card details, and try to load further code on iPhones and iPads. Optimizely, in a status notice posted at 01:02 GMT on 17 November 2026, said it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, taken steps to secure affected user accounts, and put additional protections in place. The notice was still in monitoring when we checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026. Some researchers call the campaign OPTIMJACK.
Review every Optimizely project now. A clean snippet today may still have served the code on 16 November
Optimizely's status notice does not tell customers what to do. Our advice is labelled separately below. Inventory every snippet you load, including copies you serve from your own domain. Save each file locally and search it for 1688360, atob(, .icu and track.js. A search for the domain alone can miss the base64 loader. Rotate Optimizely credentials. Hunt logs from 04:21 GMT on 16 November for the news-reported indicators. There is no CVE in the sources we cite, and nothing related was in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue when we checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026 (catalogue 2026.11.13, released at 20:24 GMT on 13 November 2026). Recheck KEV. We do not treat the absence from KEV as a statement that there has been no exploitation. We do not link proof-of-concept or exploit code.
By Simon Phillips, CTO. Reviewed by Oliver Legg, Head of SOC and IR. Last updated 18 November 2026, 18:09 GMT.
At a Glance
Based on Optimizely's Web Experimentation Security Incident notice (posted 01:02 GMT on 17 November 2026), BleepingComputer (16 November 2026, later updated with Optimizely's statement), The Hacker News (17 November 2026), and CISA KEV catalogue 2026.11.13, checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026. Last updated 18 November 2026, 18:09 GMT.
Critical by impact (our framing)
Optimizely has not published a severity rating or a CVE. Critical by impact is our framing, because malicious JavaScript in a widely loaded website snippet can reach visitors, payment forms and device browsers without those sites having been broken into themselves.
Vendor says the injected code has been removed; incident still in monitoring
Optimizely says it has fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects. The status notice was still in monitoring when we checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026, with no later update than 01:02 GMT on 17 November. The Hacker News reports that a mass cleanup began at about 20:40 GMT on 16 November, and that by 21:52 GMT only one previously identified snippet still carried the code. A snippet that is clean now may still have served the code that day.
Sites loading an affected Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet
Security researchers, as reported by The Hacker News and BleepingComputer, found the code in 188 of 1,611 snippets checked, at 178 organisations. They say the real number is likely higher. Named sites include CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Fox News, among others. Optimizely's own main site and login page also carried the code, according to The Hacker News. Snippets served from a customer's own domain were affected too if the project was changed.
Fix deployed; injected code removed; accounts secured
Optimizely told BleepingComputer the vulnerability was in the Experimentation account signup flow, and that it blocked that path, removed the injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts, and blocked unauthorised code delivery in Cloudflare. It says it has notified all affected customers. The public status notice does not tell customers what to do next.
The Hacker News, reporting security researchers, says the first injection was seen at 04:21 GMT in the BBC's snippet. That first injection loaded webshell[.]lol.
The Hacker News says a card skimmer was added at 13:43 GMT, capturing card number, expiry and CVV from the site's own form fields. The first injection, at 04:21 GMT, predates the skimmer.
The Hacker News says a 60-second page reload, used to retry the iOS stage, was added only in this window, and only for visits from iOS 18.6 or earlier.
A mass cleanup began at about 20:40 GMT. By 21:52 GMT, researchers reported that only one of the previously identified snippets still carried the code.
Optimizely posts the Web Experimentation Security Incident notice: vulnerability fixed, injected code removed, accounts secured, additional protections in place. Still in monitoring when we checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026.
Affected scope
| Scope | Status | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Optimizely Web Experimentation projects | Some projects had malicious JavaScript added | Review Project JavaScript in every project, and custom code in every experiment, for anything you did not write. Save a local copy of each snippet and search it. |
| Websites that load an Optimizely snippet, including from their own domain | Visitors may have been served the code on 16 November | A site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised, according to security researchers reported by The Hacker News. Still review the snippet, logs and any payments taken that day. |
| Optimizely's own main site and login page | Carried the code, according to The Hacker News | Treat visits to those pages on 16 November like visits to any other affected site. |
| Visitors, including iPhone and iPad users | May have seen swapped wallet addresses, card skimming, or further code on iOS | The Hacker News reports no iPhones actually being taken over. Still update iOS, check payments made on 16 November, and watch card statements. |
A separate Optimizely status incident, a Recommendations tracking and reporting outage, was also open when we checked. It is an infrastructure issue, not this security incident, and is not covered here.
What the injected code did (news reporting)
The attacker wrote a loader into the Project JavaScript field of customer projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched, according to security researchers reported by The Hacker News and BleepingComputer. The snippets were still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's own certificate, so every page that loaded one also ran the loader.
The loader came in three versions. Most snippets loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js directly. One version hid that address in base64, so a text search for 1688360 would miss it (look for atob( as well). Another carried a full copy of the payload that runs if the domain is blocked. Blocking the domain is therefore not enough; the code has to come out of the project.
The payload, track.js, was built to replace valid cryptocurrency addresses with the attacker's in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests, and to capture card number, expiry and CVV from the site's own form fields, sending them to 1688360[.]cc/card.php. The Hacker News says it cannot read cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe, such as Stripe's hosted fields or Adyen's. The code can also send cookies that are not marked HttpOnly, and a screenshot of the page, after it swaps an address near payment wording.
On iPhones and iPads, the code was set up to load a second stage that researchers, as reported by both news outlets, identify as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, aimed at older iOS versions. The Hacker News says this second stage was loaded from two .icu domains, and that it reports no iPhones actually being taken over.
The Hacker News, reporting security researchers, says the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 as of 19:25 GMT on 16 November. BleepingComputer reported about $7,000 as of the same day, and both outlets note that some of those wallet addresses were already in use before the injections, so the total may not all come from this campaign.
What to Do in the Next 24 Hours
Proactive on the left. Reactive on the right. Vendor steps and our advice are labelled separately.
Find every snippet and take out anything you did not write
- Optimizely: the vendor says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, secured affected accounts, and notified those customers. The public status notice does not set out customer steps.
- Our advice: inventory every site and project that loads an Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet, including snippets you serve from your own domain.
- Our advice: open Project JavaScript in every project, and custom code in every experiment, and remove anything you did not write.
- Our advice: save each snippet to a local file and search it for
1688360,atob(,.icuandtrack.js. Do not rely on a live fetch alone, and do not treat a search for1688360as complete. - Our advice: rotate Optimizely user, API token and integration credentials.
Hunt, and look after visitors
- Our advice: hunt DNS, proxy, firewall and EDR logs from 04:21 GMT on 16 November for the news-reported indicators listed under How to Hunt.
- Our advice: The Hacker News says the card skimmer was added at 13:43 GMT on 16 November, after the first injection at 04:21 GMT. If your own forms took card details from 13:43 GMT that day, treat those cards as possibly exposed and follow your incident process. Cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe were reported as out of reach of this skimmer.
- Our advice: rotate session tokens kept in cookies without the HttpOnly flag, and review unusual account activity.
- Our advice: tell affected customers and visitors what you know, and point them to check cryptocurrency payments, card statements and iOS updates.
Proactive: Vendor Steps, Then Ours
Optimizely's public advice first. CybaVerse advice is labelled separately and is not a substitute for the vendor's guidance.
The vendor has applied a fix and says it removed the injected code
Optimizely's Web Experimentation Security Incident notice says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, taken steps to secure affected user accounts, and put additional protections in place to prevent unauthorized code from being delivered. Prefer that page for the latest official wording. When we checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026 the incident was still in monitoring, with no later update than 01:02 GMT on 17 November.
Further detail given to BleepingComputer
Optimizely told BleepingComputer that the vulnerability was in the Experimentation account signup flow, that it has blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected user accounts, blocked unauthorised code from being delivered in Cloudflare, is continuing to investigate, will publish relevant updates on its status page, and has notified all affected customers. That signup-flow wording is not in the public status notice.
Inventory every snippet, including ones you host yourself
Find every Optimizely Web Experimentation project across your estate and your clients'. Include marketing sites, checkout pages, previews and snippets you serve from your own domain. A site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised, but you still need to know which properties loaded a snippet on 16 November.
Review Project JavaScript and save a local snippet copy
Open the Project JavaScript field in every project, and the custom code in every experiment, and look for anything you did not write. Save a copy of each snippet to a local file and search that file for 1688360, atob(, .icu and track.js. Do not fetch snippets from the network as a substitute for a saved copy, and do not treat a search for 1688360 alone as enough. The detection pack checker on this page scans a file you have already saved. It does not fetch snippets itself. The pack README explains how to save one.
Rotate Optimizely credentials and tighten who can write to a project
Review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to each Optimizely account, and rotate those credentials. Optimizely says it ended sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected vendor-side accounts; that does not replace rotating the credentials you control.
Keep third-party tags off card fields, and plan visitor communications
Where you take card details, prefer the payment provider's own fields in a cross-origin iframe. The Hacker News reports that this skimmer could not read those fields. Keep third-party tags off checkout pages where you can. Plan how you will tell customers and visitors if their session on 16 November may have been exposed.
Free Detection Pack
Built by the CybaVerse threat hunt team for businesses, internal IT teams and MSPs. Check exposure offline and hunt for signs of misuse. Everything is read-only. Pack version 1.0.0 is the download on this page. The KQL and Sigma have not been run against live data.
check-optimjack.sh
Read-only offline snippet checker, pack version 1.0.0. It only scans snippet copies you have already saved, plus an optional iOS inventory CSV with the header device,os_version. It does not fetch snippets from the network, and it never contacts Optimizely. The pack README explains how to save a snippet yourself, separately from the checker.
bash check-optimjack.sh --scan ./saved-snippets
# Optional iOS inventory. Header: device,os_version
bash check-optimjack.sh --ios ios-inventory.csv
bash check-optimjack.sh --scan ./saved-snippets --ios ios-inventory.csvCheck-Optimjack.ps1
The same offline checker in PowerShell 7, with identical output and exit codes. It also runs under PowerShell on Linux. It only scans saved snippet copies and does not fetch anything from the network.
pwsh -File Check-Optimjack.ps1 -Scan ./saved-snippets
pwsh -File Check-Optimjack.ps1 -Ios ios-inventory.csv
pwsh -File Check-Optimjack.ps1 -Scan ./saved-snippets -Ios ios-inventory.csvKQL and Sigma
11 KQL hunts for Microsoft Sentinel and Defender, all starting at 04:00 GMT on 16 November 2026. NEWS IOC: Q1 and Q1b (DNS and network), Q2 and Q2b (proxy and URL clicks), and Q3 (the two published track.js hashes). OUR PATTERN: Q4, Q4b and Q4c (Optimizely load inventory, plus an indicator within 10 minutes of a load), Q5 and Q5b (iOS compliance against the kit-comment thresholds), and Q6 (iOS devices that reached a news-reported indicator). 4 Sigma rules (3 NEWS IOC and 1 OUR PATTERN), with Kusto conversions included. None of the KQL or Sigma has been run against live data. A hunt hit means a device contacted or looked up an indicator. It does not prove the code ran.
Verdicts
- CLEANNo indicator, search term or heuristic in any saved snippet, and every iOS row at or above the fixed versions (exit 0).
- IOC FOUNDA news-reported indicator string or hash, or the base64 form of the payload domain, was found in a saved snippet (exit 1). Treat that snippet as compromised.
- SUSPICIOUSOnly search terms (
atob(,.icu,track.js) or our loader heuristics matched. Review those files by hand (exit 2). - IOS BELOW FIXEDAt least one iOS or iPadOS row is below the kit-comment thresholds (exit 3). Those thresholds are not independently verified.
- UNKNOWNA file was skipped, a folder had no files, or an iOS row could not be judged (exit 4).
Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | CLEAN |
| 1 | IOC FOUND |
| 2 | SUSPICIOUS |
| 3 | IOS BELOW FIXED |
| 4 | UNKNOWN |
| 5 | Usage or read error, including a bad iOS CSV header |
The full pack zip contains 32 files (pack version 1.0.0). Precedence is 5, then 1, 3, 2, 4, then 0. The checker never fetches snippets and never prints file contents, only paths, labels, line counts and a SHA-256.
Know the limits
- Both checkers are read-only and offline. They only read the snippet copies and optional iOS CSV you point them at, send no network traffic, write nothing and contain no exploit payloads.
- Optimizely's status notice publishes no indicators of compromise. Every IOC in this pack is a news-reported indicator from The Hacker News or BleepingComputer.
- A hunt hit means a device contacted or looked up an indicator. It does not prove the malicious code ran. Blocked traffic and security research can also generate hits.
- The iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 thresholds come from comments in the exploit kit's code, as reported by The Hacker News. We have not independently verified those patch levels, and the sources we cite do not confirm a link from those kits to a specific Apple CVE.
- None of the KQL or Sigma has been run against live data. Fields marked unverified in the pack README depend on your connectors.
- Prefer the hand-written KQL. Some Sigma pipeline conversions map poorly, as the pack README explains.
What is in the pack
| File | What it does |
|---|---|
| check-optimjack.sh | Offline snippet checker for Linux and macOS (bash). Scans saved copies only |
| Check-Optimjack.ps1 | The same checker in PowerShell 7 |
| KQL (11 hunts) | Microsoft Sentinel and Defender hunts Q1 to Q6, starting 04:00 GMT on 16 November |
| Sigma (4 rules) | 3 NEWS IOC rules and 1 OUR PATTERN rule, plus Kusto conversions |
| tests/ | Fixtures, bash and Pester tests and a sandboxed no-network run |
| README.md | Verified facts, how to save a snippet, Optimizely vs our advice, limits and usage |
Reactive: How to Hunt (Our Advice)
Optimizely has published no indicators of compromise on its status page. The indicators below are news-reported, from The Hacker News and BleepingComputer, shown defanged. Optimizely's status notice gives no IOCs. A hunt hit means a device contacted or looked up an indicator; it does not prove the code ran. CybaOps can run these hunts across your estate. We do not link proof-of-concept or exploit code.
News-reported indicators (The Hacker News and BleepingComputer)
The Hacker News says the payload changed multiple times during 16 November, so a single file hash will not capture every version. These indicators come from the lists those outlets published, credited there to security researchers. They are not vendor IOCs.
Domains and paths
1688360[.]cc, the payload host, with the paths/track.js,/card.phpand/hit.php5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuandeil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, reported as iOS second-stage hostswebshell[.]lol, reported as the injector loaded by the first injection at 04:21 GMT on 16 November
IP address
136.113.106[.]136, the address The Hacker News says1688360[.]ccpointed to
SHA-256 (versions of track.js, The Hacker News)
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40, described as the final captured version617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3, described as the earliest captured version
Wallet addresses identified by BleepingComputer in the malicious JavaScript
- Bitcoin:
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW - Litecoin:
ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 - TRON:
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa - Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain:
0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e - Solana:
FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n - TON:
UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p - Bitcoin Cash:
qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58 - Dogecoin:
DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
Do not broadly block cdn.optimizely.com or the affected websites themselves. That host is a legitimate delivery path. Some of the wallet addresses were already in use before 16 November, so receipts on them are not, on their own, proof of theft from this campaign.
DNS, proxy and firewall logs from 04:21 GMT on 16 November
Search for the news-reported domains, the IP, and the /track.js, /card.php and /hit.php paths. Include .icu hosts. Start at 04:21 GMT on 16 November, when researchers first reported an injection, and continue past the cleanup window.
Saved snippets and web logs
Search locally saved snippet files and historical copies for 1688360, atob(, .icu and track.js. Review access logs and content-security or tag-manager change logs for unexpected Project JavaScript edits. Smartsheet's snippet was reported as cleaned once and then re-infected, which the researchers read as the attacker still having access at that point.
Endpoints, iOS estate and payment activity
Look for browser or EDR connections to the news-reported hosts. For iPhone and iPad estates, compare versions with the thresholds The Hacker News reports from comments in the exploit kit's code (iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later). We have not independently verified those patch levels, and the sources we cite do not confirm a link from those kits to a specific Apple CVE. The 60-second reload reported by The Hacker News ran only between 17:13 and 17:57 GMT, and only for iOS 18.6 or earlier. Review cryptocurrency payments and card transactions from 16 November for swapped addresses or unrecognised charges.
If you find signs of compromise (our advice)
- Take the unexpected code out of Project JavaScript and any experiment custom code, then save a clean local copy of the snippet and confirm the markers are gone.
- Rotate Optimizely credentials and any session tokens or secrets that may have been exposed in cookies without the HttpOnly flag.
- Preserve logs, saved snippets and change history.
- Start incident response for affected sites and, where card or wallet activity is involved, for those customers and visitors. Treat cards entered in your own forms on 16 November as possibly exposed.
A clean snippet now does not mean the day was clean
An upgrade, a cache refresh or a clean file today does not prove that visitors were not served the loader on 16 November. Hunt from 04:21 GMT that day, and plan visitor communications around payments and device updates.
Optimizely OPTIMJACK FAQ
Short answers based on Optimizely's status notice, BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, and CISA KEV, checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026.
What happened, and what is OPTIMJACK?
On 16 November 2026 an attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Websites that loaded the affected snippets served that code to visitors. Optimizely said it has fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code. Some researchers call the campaign OPTIMJACK. We credit security researchers only and do not name them.
Which sites were affected?
The Hacker News and BleepingComputer, reporting security researchers, say the code was found in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets that were checked, belonging to 178 organisations. The researchers say the real number is likely higher because they could only check the snippets they found in time. Named sites include CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, Fox News and others. The Hacker News says Optimizely's own main site and login page also carried the code. Some sites serve the snippet from their own domain; those were affected too, because the content comes from the same project. Optimizely has not published its own affected-customer list on the status page. Optimizely told BleepingComputer it has notified all affected customers.
Is it being exploited?
Yes. This is not a theoretical flaw. Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The Hacker News and BleepingComputer report that those snippets were served to visitors on 16 November 2026, and that the code was built to swap cryptocurrency addresses, capture card details, and load further code on iPhones and iPads. The Hacker News reports no iPhones actually being taken over. There is no CVE in the sources we cite, and nothing related was in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue when we checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026 (catalogue 2026.11.13). Recheck KEV. We do not treat the absence from KEV as a statement that there has been no exploitation. We do not link proof-of-concept or exploit code.
What has Optimizely done, and is the code gone?
In a status notice posted at 01:02 GMT on 17 November 2026, still in monitoring when we checked, Optimizely said it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, taken steps to secure affected user accounts, and put additional protections in place to prevent unauthorized code from being delivered. Optimizely told BleepingComputer that the vulnerability was in the Experimentation account signup flow, that it blocked access to the vulnerable path, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected user accounts, blocked unauthorised code delivery in Cloudflare, is continuing to investigate, and has notified all affected customers. The status notice does not say how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, when the fix went in, whether the attacker still has any access, or what customers should do. The Hacker News says a mass cleanup began at about 20:40 GMT on 16 November, and that by 21:52 GMT only one previously identified snippet still carried the code. A snippet that is clean now may still have served the code on 16 November.
What should site owners and MSPs do?
Optimizely's status notice does not tell customers what to do. Our advice: inventory every site and project that loads an Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet, including snippets you serve from your own domain. Open the Project JavaScript in every project, and the custom code in every experiment, and look for anything you did not write. Save a copy of each snippet locally and search it for 1688360, atob(, .icu and track.js. A search for 1688360 alone can miss the base64 loader. Rotate Optimizely user, API token and integration credentials. Hunt logs from 04:21 GMT on 16 November for the news-reported indicators. If your own forms take card details, treat cards entered from 13:43 GMT on 16 November, when The Hacker News says the card skimmer was added, as possibly exposed. Rotate session tokens kept in cookies without the HttpOnly flag. Do not broadly block cdn.optimizely.com, which is a legitimate delivery host.
What should visitors to affected sites do?
Our advice, aligned with visitor guidance reported by The Hacker News and BleepingComputer: if you made a cryptocurrency payment on 16 November, compare the destination address with the one you meant to pay. If you entered card details in a site's own form fields from 13:43 GMT on 16 November, when The Hacker News says the card skimmer was added, watch your statements and contact your issuer if anything looks wrong; consider asking the issuer to replace the card. Update iPhones and iPads. The Hacker News reports that comments in the exploit kit's code mark iOS 18.7.3 or later, and iOS 26.3 or later, as patched. We have not independently verified those patch levels, and the sources we cite do not confirm a link from those kits to a specific Apple CVE. The Hacker News also says a 60-second page reload, used to retry the iOS stage, ran only between 17:13 and 17:57 GMT, and only for visits from iOS 18.6 or earlier. It reports no iPhones actually being taken over. Watch for unusual account activity if you were signed in to sensitive services on an affected site.
Does the detection pack checker fetch snippets from the internet?
No. The checker in pack v1.0.0 is offline and read-only. It does not fetch snippets from the network. It only scans snippet copies you have already saved, looking for 1688360, atob(, .icu and track.js, and it can also read an optional iOS inventory CSV with the header device,os_version. Exit codes are 0 clean, 1 IOC found, 2 suspicious, 3 iOS below fixed, 4 unknown and 5 usage error. The pack README explains how to save a snippet yourself, separately from the checker. The KQL and Sigma in the pack have not been run against live data.
Where do we get official updates?
Watch Optimizely's service status page and the Web Experimentation Security Incident notice (posted 17 November 2026, 01:02 GMT). Optimizely told BleepingComputer it will publish relevant updates there.
Need help checking every Optimizely snippet you and your clients load?
CybaOps monitors your servers, endpoints and cloud workloads, whether that's your own business or your clients'. UK-based analysts monitor alerts 24/7, run these threat hunts and act on pre-approved response actions. The CybaOps Remediation Engine is live: it can fix security issues automatically, so gaps get closed rather than just reported. CybaRemediate, our remediation product line built on the Remediation Engine, is live. Book a CybaOps demo and see the Remediation Engine close a gap.
Sources
- Optimizely Service Status (checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026)
- Optimizely: Web Experimentation Security Incident (posted 17 November 2026, 01:02 GMT; still in monitoring when checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026)
- BleepingComputer: Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware (16 November 2026; later updated with Optimizely's statement)
- The Hacker News: Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors (17 November 2026)
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (no related entry when checked at 08:38 GMT on 17 November 2026, catalogue 2026.11.13, released 20:24 GMT on 13 November 2026)
Related threat guides: All threat guides.