Have you disabled the RMM+ extension in your ScreenConnect environment?
ConnectWise rates CVE-2026-127063 Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.3, in DataComm's RMM+ extension. No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. On-premises partners should disable RMM+ now. A later BleepingComputer report, citing security researchers, describes SCKit, a 16-part toolkit that tries to jump to technician workstations using CVE-2026-84869. Researchers have not seen that jump succeed. Confirm every technician client is on 26.6.5 or later.
ConnectWise Critical (CVSS 4.0 9.3). Disable RMM+ on premises now. No fixed version has been announced.
ConnectWise, as the CNA, published CVE-2026-127063 at 17:50 GMT on 12 November 2026 and rates it Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.3 (vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). The issue is in DataComm's third-party RMM+ extension for ScreenConnect. The official CVE record says ScreenConnect server and client software are not impacted, and that deployments without the extension are not affected. The record describes a static API secret used by default (CWE-1392). If that default is retained, unauthorised access to the extension API may be possible, including the ability to send commands to managed agents. The ConnectWise disclosure states: "No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation." Cloud customers need take no action for the extension, because ConnectWise has disabled and removed the affected extensions from cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments; on-premises partners should disable RMM+ immediately, verify that it remains disabled, and not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance. The ConnectWise Trust Center, updated at 18:45 GMT on 12 November 2026, is in status investigation ongoing, protective actions identified. It says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the independently developed third-party extension, and it publishes indicators of compromise. It also says the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique is blocked by the fix for CVE-2026-84869, released in ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 on 8 September 2026. SecurityWeek and The Register, both published before the CVE record, report exploitation of an RMM+ flaw in the 11 November campaign. We treat that as a reported, likely link, not as independently confirmed identification of CVE-2026-127063. CVE-2026-127063 was not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue when we checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT. We do not treat that absence as a statement that there has been no exploitation. A later BleepingComputer report, published at 22:53 GMT on 12 November 2026 and citing security researchers, describes SCKit, a toolkit of 16 scripts and components, including an attempted jump from an infected endpoint to a technician workstation using CVE-2026-84869. Those researchers have not seen that jump succeed. The ConnectWise CNA score for CVE-2026-84869, shown on NVD, is CVSS 3.1 9.9 Critical. CISA added that client flaw to KEV on 11 September 2026. Confirm every technician client is on 26.6.5 or later.
By Simon Phillips, CTO. Reviewed by Oliver Legg, Head of SOC and IR. Last updated 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT.
At a Glance
Based on the official CVE record, the ConnectWise disclosure, the ConnectWise Trust Center advisory (latest update 18:45 GMT on 12 November 2026), ConnectWise partner guidance, the NVD records for CVE-2026-127063 and CVE-2026-84869, the ConnectWise 8 September 2026 client bulletin, SecurityWeek, The Register, two BleepingComputer reports, and CISA's KEV catalogue, checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT. Last updated 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT.
ConnectWise Critical (CVSS 4.0 9.3)
ConnectWise, as the CNA, rates CVE-2026-127063 Critical. The official CVE record and the ConnectWise disclosure give CVSS 4.0 9.3, vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, and list CWE-1392, Use of Default Credentials. The NVD record, status Received when we checked, repeats that ConnectWise score as Secondary and had not published its own analysis.
CVE published; Trust Center investigation ongoing; not in KEV
The official CVE record was published at 17:50 GMT on 12 November 2026. NVD published its record at 18:17 GMT the same day, status Received when we checked. The ConnectWise Trust Center, last updated at 18:45 GMT on 12 November 2026, is in status investigation ongoing, protective actions identified, and says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the independently developed third-party extension. SecurityWeek and The Register, both published before the CVE record, report exploitation of an RMM+ flaw in the 11 November campaign. We treat that as a reported, likely link, not as independently confirmed identification of this CVE. CVE-2026-127063 was not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue when we checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT. That catalogue (2026.11.10) was released at 19:03 GMT on 10 November 2026, before this CVE. Recheck KEV. We do not treat the absence from KEV as a statement that there has been no exploitation.
DataComm RMM+, all extension versions
The official CVE record lists the product as DataComm RMM+, with the ScreenConnect extension API module, and affected versions as all extension versions. Scope: the third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect. Deployments without the extension are not affected. ScreenConnect server or client software are not impacted. The CVE names RMM+ only. ConnectWise disabled four related extensions as a precaution: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link, alongside RMM+. The Trust Center says it identified approximately 400 partner environments with one or more of them. Their presence alone does not establish compromise.
No fixed RMM+ version; disable on premises; client 26.6.5
The ConnectWise disclosure states: "No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation." Cloud: no action required for the extension; ConnectWise disabled and removed the affected third-party RMM+ extensions from cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments. On-premises: disable the RMM+ extension immediately, verify that it remains disabled, and do not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance. The Trust Center also says the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique is blocked by the fix for CVE-2026-84869, released in ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 on 8 September 2026, and that ConnectWise has verified that client versions 26.6.5 and later block that spread technique. That protection does not establish how attackers first gained access, prevent every form of unauthorised software deployment, or remove an existing compromise.
ConnectWise published a ScreenConnect client security bulletin for CVE-2026-84869 and released client version 26.6.5. The CNA score, shown on NVD and in that bulletin, is CVSS 3.1 9.9 Critical. ScreenConnect servers are not impacted.
CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.
The Register reports that security researchers spotted the campaign at around 17:47 UTC on 11 November 2026.
ConnectWise first published its Trust Center advisory, then in status cause and scope under investigation.
BleepingComputer published a report of an active campaign against MSPs, later updated at 02:06 GMT on 12 November 2026. We re-checked that article at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT.
ConnectWise also published partner guidance on the campaign, dated 11 November 2026. It identified approximately 400 partner environments with one or more named RMM+ family extensions, and said it had disabled those extensions where it could take action.
ConnectWise updated the Trust Center advisory, including a list of reported indicators of compromise, then in status investigation ongoing.
SecurityWeek reports the campaign and a flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 that accepts a blank access key when none was set. That article predates the CVE record.
The Register publishes its report of the campaign and the same 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 blank-key finding. That article also predates the CVE record.
The ConnectWise CNA published the official CVE record for CVE-2026-127063, rated Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.3.
NVD published its record. Status was still Received when we checked.
ConnectWise updated the Trust Center advisory. Status is investigation ongoing, protective actions identified. The update says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the independently developed third-party extension, relays the 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 blank-key report and says ConnectWise is assessing those findings, lists indicators of compromise, and says the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique is blocked by the fix for CVE-2026-84869 in client 26.6.5.
BleepingComputer published a further report on SCKit, citing security researchers. It describes a toolkit of 16 scripts and components, an attempted jump to technician workstations using CVE-2026-84869, and the same campaign figure of at least 288 endpoints across 48 organisations. Researchers have not seen that jump succeed, and they reported no evidence of a bypass at that time.
We checked the official CVE record, the ConnectWise disclosure, the Trust Center advisory, the 8 September 2026 client bulletin, ConnectWise partner guidance, the NVD records for CVE-2026-127063 and CVE-2026-84869, SecurityWeek, The Register, both BleepingComputer reports, and CISA's KEV catalogue 2026.11.10. CVE-2026-84869 has been in KEV since 11 September 2026. CVE-2026-127063 was not listed. Recheck those sources.
What the CVE record says
The official CVE record, published by ConnectWise as the CNA, describes CVE-2026-127063 as follows. The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default. The value can be changed by an administrator; however, environments retaining the default value may allow unauthorised access to extension API functionality, including the ability to send commands to managed agents. This issue is specific to the third-party extension and does not affect the ScreenConnect server or client. Deployments without the extension are not affected. The affected product is listed as DataComm RMM+, all extension versions. The CVE names RMM+ only. We do not add further technical detail about how the extension API is used.
What the Trust Center adds, and what the press reports
The ConnectWise Trust Center, in its 18:45 GMT update on 12 November 2026 about this investigation, says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the independently developed third-party extension, and points partners to the CVE record and the GitHub advisory. SecurityWeek and The Register, both published before that CVE record, report exploitation of an RMM+ flaw in the 11 November campaign. We treat the press accounts as reporting a likely link, not as independently confirming the CVE identifier.
Researchers report, as relayed in the Trust Center (ConnectWise says "We are assessing these findings") and by SecurityWeek and The Register, that RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 could accept an empty access key when none had been configured. That version-specific finding is not in the official CVE record, which lists all extension versions and describes a static default API secret. We show both accounts and do not treat them as confirmed to be the same issue. The Register also reports that, because RMM+ operates independently of ScreenConnect's normal user accounts and authentication controls, an attacker could potentially execute commands without defeating MFA. That MFA wording is The Register's only. SecurityWeek reports commands reaching endpoints with no corresponding login activity, with reviewed logs linked to RMM+ instead. Those are press accounts, not statements in the CVE record.
SecurityWeek, at the time of writing, reports 288 hosts across 48 organisations, with rogue ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit called SCKit pushed to managed endpoints. The Register reports the same 288 hosts and 48 organisations, and says researchers spotted the activity at around 17:47 UTC. An earlier BleepingComputer report, published at 22:56 GMT on 11 November 2026 and last confirmed updated at 02:06 GMT on 12 November 2026, described the same campaign and listed the installer pattern above. A later BleepingComputer report, published at 22:53 GMT on 12 November 2026 and citing security researchers, also gives the figure of at least 288 endpoints across 48 organisations. ConnectWise has not confirmed those press figures in the sources we checked. We make no claim of our own about confirmed compromise in any estate.
What the later BleepingComputer report says about SCKit
The BleepingComputer report published at 22:53 GMT on 12 November 2026, citing security researchers, describes SCKit as a toolkit of 16 scripts and components used in this campaign. Researchers say the attackers first deploy additional ScreenConnect Access clients on infected customer endpoints, configured to connect to servers under the attackers' control. Those rogue Access clients are installed on customer endpoints, not on technician machines. A component called RelayTrap is designed to replace the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest process on an infected endpoint. Rather than a precompiled executable, RelayTrap is stored as a C# source file named RelayTrap.cs, downloaded to the device, and compiled locally by a PowerShell script. A separate component, TrapWatch, monitors ScreenConnect services and prepares the replacement Guest process. When a technician opens an interactive session, RelayTrap tries to send a file back to the technician's workstation and have it run, attempting to use CVE-2026-84869.
If that hop succeeded, other SCKit components would try to steal ScreenConnect session cookies from browsers, enumerate reachable endpoints, and push commands through legitimate management features, including Shared Toolbox. Researchers cited by BleepingComputer have not seen that jump to technician workstations succeed in this campaign. Separately, they reproduced the attempted exploit against a current ScreenConnect client. In that test, the Guest side queued the transfer, but the current client never requested or ran the payload. That result is from the reproduction against a current client, not from what was observed in the live attack. Console takeover attempts failed in every recovered host log examined. The researchers said they had no evidence of successful exploitation of this flaw in the attacks, and no evidence of a bypass at this time. We do not describe how to carry out the technique, and we do not link any proof of concept.
What CVE-2026-84869 is
CVE-2026-84869 is a ScreenConnect client flaw. The NVD record quotes the ConnectWise CNA description: a condition in the ScreenConnect client may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation in certain circumstances, and ScreenConnect servers are not impacted. The CNA score, shown on NVD and in ConnectWise's 8 September 2026 bulletin, is CVSS 3.1 9.9 Critical, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. NVD lists that score as Secondary and, when we checked, had status Analyzed. The bulletin also labels the issue severity as Important, with Priority 1 High. Affected versions are those prior to 26.6.5. The fix is client 26.6.5 or later. After upgrading, ConnectWise tells partners to reinstall host clients and update access agents. Cloud instances were updated by ConnectWise; updating a cloud console does not automatically update technician clients. CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to KEV on 11 September 2026. Catalogue 2026.11.10 still listed it when we checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT. That KEV listing is separate from whether the technician-hop technique succeeded in this November campaign.
What ConnectWise tells partners
The Trust Center, last updated at 18:45 GMT on 12 November 2026, is in status investigation ongoing, protective actions identified. ConnectWise says it continues investigating unauthorised access to certain partner ScreenConnect environments, and that at this time it has found no evidence of a compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure or that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability. Its initial assessment suggests the activity may involve a threat actor's abuse of independent third-party extensions installed in partner environments, and it is continuing to validate that assessment. The official CVE record is consistent with the point that the issue is in the third-party extension, not in ScreenConnect server or client software.
ConnectWise identified approximately 400 partner environments with at least one independently developed third-party extension from the RMM+ family. Their presence alone does not establish compromise. The CVE names RMM+ only; the other four extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link) were disabled as a precaution, alongside RMM+. On cloud-hosted environments, ConnectWise has disabled and removed the affected extensions, and the official disclosure says cloud customers need take no action for the extension. On-premises partners should disable them immediately, verify that they remain disabled, and not re-enable or reinstall them pending further guidance. See the extension removal instructions.
The Trust Center also says: "The toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique is blocked by the fix for CVE-2026-84869, released in ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 on September 8, 2026." It adds that ConnectWise has verified that client versions 26.6.5 and later block the endpoint-to-technician spread technique used by this toolkit, and that clients running earlier versions require updating. All partners, cloud-hosted and on-premises, should verify that technician clients run 26.6.5 or later; updating a cloud console does not automatically update technician clients. This protection addresses the attempted spread technique. It does not establish how attackers initially accessed partner environments, prevent every form of unauthorised software deployment, or remove an existing compromise. While updates are pending, ConnectWise also advises reducing Transfer Files permissions where they are not required (older versions may label this TransferFilesInSession). After preserving evidence, ConnectWise tells partners to clear queued commands and tools on the server. After upgrading, reinstall host clients and update access agents to 26.6.5 or later.
From a trusted device, revoke all active ScreenConnect web sessions and associated identity-provider sessions, change relevant credentials, and verify that multifactor authentication is enforced. ConnectWise notes that changing passwords alone does not invalidate all existing sessions. Do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean affected endpoints. Isolate affected devices, including technician workstations that connected to them, preserve evidence and logs, and validate remediation before reconnecting. Disabling extensions and changing credentials alone may not remove unauthorised software, persistence or access already established on endpoints. Follow the ScreenConnect hardening guide.
What to Do in the Next 24 Hours
Proactive on the left. Reactive on the right. Vendor steps and our advice are labelled separately.
Disable RMM+ on premises, then follow our advice
- ConnectWise: on-premises partners should disable the RMM+ extension immediately, verify that it remains disabled, and not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance. Also keep Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link disabled; the CVE names RMM+ only, and the other four were disabled as a precaution. Cloud customers need take no action for the extension; ConnectWise has already disabled and removed the affected extensions there.
- ConnectWise: update every technician client, on cloud-hosted and on-premises estates, to version 26.6.5 or later, and verify the installed version on each workstation. The Trust Center says the fix for CVE-2026-84869 in that client release blocks the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique. Reinstall host clients and update access agents to 26.6.5 or later after upgrading. Reduce Transfer Files permissions while updates are pending, where those permissions are not required (older versions may label this TransferFilesInSession). After preserving evidence, clear queued commands and tools on the server.
- ConnectWise: investigate with separate security tooling, not interactive ScreenConnect sessions to suspected compromised devices. Isolate affected devices, preserve evidence and logs, and validate remediation before reconnecting.
- ConnectWise: from a trusted device, revoke ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions, change relevant credentials, verify that multifactor authentication is enforced, use unique passwords, and remove unnecessary administrative access.
- Our advice: inventory extensions on every on-premises instance and remove the RMM+ family; set and rotate strong keys on any extension that uses one; restrict internet access to ScreenConnect web and API endpoints; and alert on unexpected extension API use.
- Our advice: confirm every technician workstation runs ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 or later, including after a cloud console update. Remove unneeded third-party extensions. Do not open interactive ScreenConnect sessions to possibly infected endpoints; investigate with separate EDR or forensic tools. Tighten who can use Run Command and Shared Toolbox.
Hunt and contain with separate tooling
- Our advice: look for commands or Run actions via RMM+ with no matching technician login; extra ScreenConnect Access clients on customer endpoints pointing at unknown servers; RelayTrap.cs or other .cs files downloaded and compiled by PowerShell (on Windows this commonly appears as csc.exe started by PowerShell); a replaced or unexpected Guest process; Run Command or Shared Toolbox activity with no matching technician login; and new PowerShell, batch or .cmd files. Hunt ConnectWise's published indicators, and the earlier BleepingComputer installer pattern, as listed on this page.
- ConnectWise and our advice: do not triage over ScreenConnect itself. Use separate security tooling.
- ConnectWise: isolate affected devices, preserve evidence, and validate remediation before restoring connectivity. Disabling the extensions and changing credentials alone may not remove unauthorised software, persistence mechanisms, or access already established on endpoints.
- Our advice: if a technician connected to an infected host, treat that workstation as suspect. End and revoke ScreenConnect sessions and cookies, rotate credentials, and review what the account touched. From a trusted device, revoke ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions, rotate credentials, and confirm cleanup before reconnecting. Start incident response for every customer environment that partner account could reach.
Proactive: Vendor Steps, Then Ours
ConnectWise's advice first, then our advice. Our advice is not a substitute for the official CVE record, the ConnectWise disclosure, or the ConnectWise Trust Center advisory.
Cloud customers need take no action for the extension
Vendor path, from the official CVE record and the ConnectWise disclosure: no action is required for cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments. ConnectWise disabled and removed the affected third-party RMM+ extensions there.
On premises, disable RMM+ now and keep it disabled
Vendor path: disable the RMM+ extension immediately, verify that it remains disabled, and do not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance. The ConnectWise disclosure states: "No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation." The CVE names RMM+ only. ConnectWise also named Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link for precautionary disabling, alongside RMM+. See the extension removal instructions.
Update technician clients to 26.6.5 or later
Vendor path, from the Trust Center and the 8 September 2026 bulletin: update every technician client, on cloud-hosted and on-premises estates, to version 26.6.5 or later, and verify the installed version on each workstation. Updating a cloud console does not automatically update technician clients. After upgrading, ConnectWise also tells partners to reinstall host clients and update access agents. The Trust Center says: "The toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique is blocked by the fix for CVE-2026-84869, released in ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 on September 8, 2026." It also says ConnectWise has verified that client versions 26.6.5 and later block that technique. This protection does not establish how attackers first gained access, prevent every form of unauthorised software deployment, or remove an existing compromise. While updates are pending, reduce Transfer Files permissions where they are not required (older versions may label this TransferFilesInSession). That is a temporary mitigation, not a substitute for the client update. After preserving evidence, ConnectWise also tells partners to clear queued commands and tools on the server.
Investigate with separate tooling, isolate, and keep logs
Vendor path: do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean affected endpoints. Use separate security tooling. Isolate affected devices, including technician workstations that connected to them. Preserve evidence and logs, then validate remediation before reconnecting.
Secure access from a trusted device
Vendor path: from a trusted device, revoke all active ScreenConnect web sessions and associated identity-provider sessions, change relevant credentials, and verify that multifactor authentication is enforced. ConnectWise notes that changing passwords alone does not invalidate all existing sessions. Follow the ScreenConnect hardening guide.
Inventory on-premises extensions and remove the RMM+ family
Our advice: inventory every extension on every on-premises ScreenConnect instance you run, including those you host for clients, and remove the RMM+ family (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link). Export the Extensions page and run our checker with --extension-list, or with --extensions-dir on an exported copy, never against a live investigation session over ScreenConnect.
Set and rotate strong keys on any extension that uses one
Our advice: for any remaining extension that uses an API secret or access key, set a strong unique value and rotate it. The official CVE record says the RMM+ default can be changed by an administrator, but the current vendor mitigation is still to disable RMM+, not to keep it enabled with a new key.
Restrict internet access to ScreenConnect web and API endpoints
Our advice: restrict internet access to ScreenConnect web and API endpoints so they are not reachable from the open internet if you can avoid it. Alert on unexpected extension API use. Q8 and Q8b in the pack are our patterns for that; their URL paths are unverified.
Confirm every technician workstation runs 26.6.5 or later
Our advice, on top of ConnectWise's client update guidance: confirm every technician workstation is running ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 or later, and do not assume a cloud console update has done that for you.
Remove unneeded third-party extensions, and tighten Run Command and Shared Toolbox
Our advice: remove third-party extensions you do not need, not only the named RMM+ family. Tighten who can use Run Command and Shared Toolbox, and review those permissions on a regular basis.
Do not open interactive sessions to possibly infected endpoints
Our advice: do not open an interactive ScreenConnect session to a possibly infected endpoint. Investigate with separate EDR or forensic tools, not over ScreenConnect itself. Security researchers, cited by BleepingComputer, make the same recommendation.
Free Detection Pack
Built by the CybaVerse threat hunt team for businesses, internal IT teams and MSPs. Check exposure offline and hunt for signs of misuse. Everything is read-only.
check-screenconnect-extensions.sh
Read-only, offline checker. Use --extension-list with an export of the Extensions page (one line per extension as Name, Name|State or Name|State|Version). It reports each of the five RMM+ family names as VULNERABLE, DISABLED, REMOVED or UNKNOWN. Since pack v1.2.0, --client-inventory checks installed client versions on one machine against 26.6.5 and reports OUTDATED CLIENT (exit 6) when a client is below that build. You can also point it at a copy of App_Extensions with --extensions-dir, at a clients export with --clients and --expected-host, and at a folder of files with --files-root. It never contacts ScreenConnect, writes nothing, runs nothing, and never prints keys (the k=, v= and s= client parameters are not printed).
bash check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --extension-list extensions.txt
bash check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --extensions-dir /path/to/App_Extensions --clients services.txt --expected-host your-relay.example --files-root /path/to/folder
bash check-screenconnect-extensions.sh --client-inventory clients.txt --expected-host your-relay.exampleCheck-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1
The same checks in PowerShell 7, including --extension-list and --client-inventory, with identical output and exit codes, including exit 6 for an outdated client. On Windows, --local reads this machine's ScreenConnect client services and, if present, the default App_Extensions folder, still read-only. It also never prints keys. Use --expected-host with your own relay host.
pwsh -File Check-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1 --local --expected-host your-relay.example
pwsh -File Check-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1 --client-inventory clients.txt --expected-host your-relay.exampleKQL and Sigma
36 KQL hunts (Q1 to Q1e inventory; Q2 to Q2g indicators from the BleepingComputer report; Q2h vendor IOC; Q2i for the two ConnectWise-listed hostnames; Q2j for RelayTrap.cs; Q3 to Q7 our patterns; Q8, Q8b, Q9, Q10 and Q11 OUR PATTERN; Q12 to Q17 our SCKit-related patterns). The URL paths used by Q8 and Q8b for extension API requests are unverified; check them against your own logs. Q2i is unverified as to whether those hostnames appear in the fields used. Q12 looks for PowerShell compiling a .cs file; csc.exe is not named in the sources and is unverified for SCKit. Q13 and Q15 rely on assumed table fields and are unverified. 14 Sigma rules (including a vendor IOC rule for ConnectWise's SCKit file indicators, a NEWS IOC rule for RelayTrap.cs, and OUR PATTERN rules, including a low-fidelity rule for PowerShell starting csc.exe), with Kusto conversions included. None of the KQL has been run against a live tenant. Some Sigma rules convert on all listed Microsoft pipelines; three OUR PATTERN rules need your relay host filled in first. Where a rule does not convert, use the matching KQL hunts (the web rule uses Q8 and Q8b).
Verdicts
- VULNERABLEAn RMM+ family name (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link or RMM+ Password Link) is listed as Active or Enabled. Exit 1. Also used, with FINDINGS, if a rogue client ID, listed host, Exploited tag or named file is found. Review it with separate tooling.
- DISABLEDAn RMM+ family name is listed as Inactive or Disabled. Exit 5 (review). Keep it disabled; do not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance.
- REMOVEDAn RMM+ family name is listed as Removed or Uninstalled. Exit 0. Presence earlier may still need investigation.
- UNKNOWNAn RMM+ family name could not be classified from the supplied state, or part of the input could not be read, and nothing worse was found. Exit 3.
- REVIEWA near-matching extension name, a relay host that is not in --expected-host, or a loose file to review. Not a confirmed finding on its own. Exit 5.
- OUTDATED CLIENTSince pack v1.2.0.
--client-inventoryfound an installed ScreenConnect client below 26.6.5. Exit 6 when nothing worse was found. Update that client. - NO FINDINGSNothing matched in the files that were supplied. Exit 0.
Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | NO FINDINGS, including REMOVED |
| 1 | FINDINGS, including VULNERABLE |
| 5 | REVIEW, including DISABLED |
| 6 | OUTDATED CLIENT (a client below 26.6.5, and no findings) |
| 3 | UNKNOWN (nothing worse) |
| 4 | Usage or read error |
The full pack zip contains 66 files: 36 KQL hunts, 14 Sigma rules, both checkers, tests and the README. Matching is by name only; the pack invents no extension GUIDs or folder names.
Know the limits
- Both checkers are read-only and offline. They only read the files or local registry path you point them at, send no network traffic, write nothing, run nothing, and never print keys.
- None of the KQL has been run against a live tenant. Tune it before relying on it.
- The URL paths used by Q8, Q8b and the web Sigma rule for extension requests are unverified. Check them against your own logs.
- Where ScreenConnect stores extensions on disk, and the client service parameters (including h=, p=, k=, s= and c=), are as commonly observed on installations. ConnectWise documentation covers the Extensions page in the web console, not the on-disk layout or those client service parameters.
- This is pack v1.2.0, in folder connectwise-screenconnect-campaign-2026-11-pack-v4. It adds Q2j and Q12 to Q17,
--client-inventory(exit 6, OUTDATED CLIENT), and three Sigma rules for the later SCKit reporting, and it keeps Q2h, Q2i, Q8 to Q11 and the earlier verdicts. None of the KQL has been run against a live tenant. Items marked unverified on this page, including the Q8 URL paths, the Q2i hostname fields, csc.exe, and the Q13 and Q15 table assumptions, stay caveated. The earlier pack-v1, pack-v2 and pack-v3 folders are unchanged and are not used on this draft.
What is in the pack
| File | What it does |
|---|---|
| check-screenconnect-extensions.sh | Read-only checker for Linux and macOS (bash), including --extension-list and --client-inventory |
| Check-ScreenConnectExtensions.ps1 | The same checker in PowerShell 7, with --local and --client-inventory |
| KQL (36 hunts) | Q1 to Q1e inventory; Q2 to Q2g and Q2j from BleepingComputer; Q2h vendor IOC; Q2i hostname hunt; Q3 to Q7, Q8, Q8b, Q9 to Q11, and Q12 to Q17 our patterns |
| Sigma (14 rules) | Vendor IOC, campaign IOC, SCKit NEWS IOC and our patterns; Kusto conversions included |
| tests/ | Fixtures and tests (in the full pack) |
| README.md | Verified facts, ConnectWise vs our advice, limits and usage |
Reactive: How to Hunt (Our Advice)
The hunts below are CybaVerse advice. Vendor IOC values are from the ConnectWise Trust Center as listed on this page. Indicators and the installer pattern from the earlier BleepingComputer report are attributed to that report. The later BleepingComputer SCKit account, published at 22:53 GMT on 12 November 2026, is attributed to that report and to the security researchers it cites. Campaign observations from SecurityWeek and The Register are attributed to those outlets. None of the KQL has been run against a live tenant. CybaOps can run a hunt across your estate or your clients'.
Look for RMM+ commands with no matching technician login
Our advice: look for commands or Run actions via RMM+ that have no matching technician login. SecurityWeek reports commands reaching endpoints with no corresponding login activity, with reviewed logs linked to RMM+ instead. Treat hits as leads, not as proof on their own. Do not triage over ScreenConnect itself.
Look for ScreenConnect clients you did not deploy, and for SCKit host signs
Our advice: look for extra ScreenConnect Access clients on customer endpoints you did not deploy, or clients that point at unknown relays or attacker-controlled servers. Run our checker with --expected-host, and with --clients or --files-root as required. The checker never prints keys. Also look for a replaced or unexpected ScreenConnect Guest process, and for RelayTrap.cs or other .cs files downloaded and compiled by PowerShell. On Windows, that compile commonly appears as csc.exe started by PowerShell. Security researchers, cited in the later BleepingComputer report, describe those SCKit behaviours. SecurityWeek and The Register earlier reported the campaign pushed rogue ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit called SCKit. Treat hits as leads, not as proof on their own.
Look for new PowerShell, batch or .cmd files, published indicators, and toolbox activity
Our advice: look for unexpected new PowerShell, batch or .cmd files on managed endpoints and technician workstations, and for Run Command or Shared Toolbox activity with no matching technician login. Review the ConnectWise indicators listed on this page, hunted in pack v1.2.0 as Q2h, Q2i and Q2j, and our SCKit-related patterns Q12 to Q17, and the earlier BleepingComputer installer pattern, which is not in ConnectWise's list. Use separate security tooling, not an interactive ScreenConnect session.
If you find signs of compromise, isolate and rotate credentials
Our advice: isolate affected devices, then from a trusted device revoke ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions, rotate credentials, and confirm cleanup before reconnecting. If a technician connected to an infected host, treat that workstation as suspect: end and revoke ScreenConnect sessions and cookies, rotate credentials, and review what the account touched. ConnectWise warns that disabling extensions and changing credentials alone may not remove unauthorised software, persistence or access already established on endpoints. Start incident response for every customer environment that partner account could reach.
If you find signs of compromise (our advice)
- Isolate affected customer devices and any technician workstations that may be involved, and preserve evidence before cleanup.
- Do not triage over ScreenConnect itself. Use separate security tooling.
- From a trusted device, revoke ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions, and rotate credentials.
- Confirm cleanup before reconnecting those devices.
- Hunt for ScreenConnect clients you did not deploy, or that point at unknown relays, for RelayTrap.cs or a replaced Guest process, and review the ConnectWise indicators and the BleepingComputer installer pattern listed on this page.
- If a technician connected to an infected host, treat that workstation as suspect: end and revoke ScreenConnect sessions and cookies, rotate credentials, and review what the account touched.
- Start incident response for every customer environment that the partner account could reach, not only the ScreenConnect host.
Indicators published by ConnectWise
ConnectWise published indicators of compromise on its Trust Center advisory (latest update 18:45 GMT on 12 November 2026) to support investigation, and has said they do not establish the initial access method or confirmed root cause. An absence of matches does not rule out compromise. We have not independently confirmed these values in a customer environment. All are written in defanged form and are not links. IP addresses: 185.99.255[.]28 (ConnectWise: attacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay; hostname screen, as reported, unverified by us); 155.94.150[.]39 (ConnectWise: secondary command-and-control infrastructure; hostname WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1, as reported, unverified by us). Those two ConnectWise-listed hostnames are hunted in pack v1.2.0 as Q2i. The hunt for hostname screen is low fidelity and is only raised together with 185.99.255[.]28. Domains and URLs: ns.mo7sen[.]dev (ConnectWise: malicious PowerShell loader delivery); the staging URL listed as hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4; sc.payproofkit[.]com (ConnectWise: rogue ScreenConnect deployment and secondary command-and-control); cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com (ConnectWise: additional rogue ScreenConnect deployment); newnewnew.gotdns[.]org and soxnewwork.homedns[.]org (ConnectWise: attacker command-and-control infrastructure). Files and scripts: sckit-run.bat (ConnectWise: retrieves and executes the malicious loader), sckit-decoder.ps1 (ConnectWise: PowerShell decoder and loader), TrapWatch.ps1 (ConnectWise: persistent SYSTEM-level execution), Panel-Lateral.ps1 (ConnectWise says this filename was partially visible in the original evidence and requires confirmation), Run-Lateral-Full.bat, runnew.cmd, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, and sqlite3.exe (ConnectWise: a legitimate utility reportedly abused to access browser-stored session and authentication data; its presence alone is not evidence of compromise). Filesystem and persistence: C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\TrapWatch.ps1, %TEMP%\sckit-*, a scheduled task named TrapWatch executing as SYSTEM (ConnectWise: reportedly every 10 seconds), and a registry Run-key value named RelayTrapLiteAlert. ScreenConnect-specific: rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091; reported attacker-associated operator or account names Addmin and rmmserver. The BleepingComputer report also lists the installer pattern /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited<N> (detections match c=Exploited). That pattern is not in ConnectWise's indicator list. We could not re-fetch the BleepingComputer article at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT because of a bot check; the pattern is restored as previously cited and is attributed only to that report. Pack v1.2.0 hunts ConnectWise's listed indicators in Q2h, the two listed hostnames in Q2i, and RelayTrap.cs in Q2j, and, separately, the earlier BleepingComputer indicators in Q2 to Q2g.
CVE-2026-127063 and the ScreenConnect campaign FAQ
Short answers based on the official CVE record, the ConnectWise disclosure, the ConnectWise Trust Center advisory, ConnectWise partner guidance, the NVD records for CVE-2026-127063 and CVE-2026-84869, the ConnectWise 8 September 2026 client bulletin, SecurityWeek, The Register, BleepingComputer, and CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue. We checked those sources, except the BleepingComputer article, at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT.
What is CVE-2026-127063?
It is a vulnerability in DataComm's third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect, published by ConnectWise as the CNA at 17:50 GMT on 12 November 2026. The official CVE record says the extension uses a static API secret by default. If that default is retained, unauthorised access to the extension API may be possible, including the ability to send commands to managed agents. The issue does not affect the ScreenConnect server or client, and deployments without the extension are not affected. It is classified as CWE-1392, Use of Default Credentials. The CVE names RMM+ only.
What is the severity, and is there a fix?
ConnectWise rates it Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.3, vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. The NVD record, status Received when we checked, repeats that score as Secondary and had not published its own analysis. The ConnectWise disclosure states: "No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation." Cloud customers need take no action for the extension; ConnectWise has disabled and removed the affected extensions from cloud-hosted environments. On-premises partners should disable RMM+ immediately, verify that it remains disabled, and not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance. The Trust Center also says the fix for CVE-2026-84869 in client 26.6.5 blocks the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique.
Which products and versions are affected?
The official CVE record lists DataComm RMM+, all extension versions. ScreenConnect server and client software are not impacted. Deployments without the extension are not affected. The CVE names RMM+ only. ConnectWise disabled four related extensions as a precaution: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link, alongside RMM+, and identified approximately 400 partner environments with one or more of them. Their presence alone does not establish compromise. Researchers report, as relayed in the Trust Center (ConnectWise says it is assessing these findings) and by SecurityWeek and The Register, that versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 could accept an empty access key when none had been configured. The CVE record does not mention those version numbers. We show both accounts and do not treat them as confirmed to be the same issue.
Is it being exploited, or in CISA KEV?
The Trust Center, in its 18:45 GMT update on this investigation, says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the independently developed third-party extension. SecurityWeek and The Register, both published before the CVE record, report exploitation of an RMM+ flaw in the 11 November campaign. A later BleepingComputer report, citing security researchers, also ties the campaign to RMM+ and to SCKit. We treat the link to CVE-2026-127063 as a reported, likely link, not as independently confirmed identification of that CVE. ConnectWise has not confirmed the press figures in the sources we checked. CVE-2026-127063 was not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue when we checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT. That catalogue predates the CVE. CVE-2026-84869, the separate client flaw SCKit tries to use for the technician hop, has been in KEV since 11 September 2026. Recheck KEV. We do not treat absence from KEV as a statement that there has been no exploitation, and we do not treat the KEV listing of CVE-2026-84869 as evidence that the technician hop succeeded in this campaign.
What should we look for?
Our advice: look for commands or Run actions via RMM+ with no matching technician login; extra ScreenConnect Access clients on customer endpoints you did not deploy, or that point at unknown servers; RelayTrap.cs or other .cs files downloaded and compiled by PowerShell (on Windows this commonly appears as csc.exe started by PowerShell); a replaced or unexpected Guest process; Run Command or Shared Toolbox activity with no matching technician login; and new PowerShell, batch or .cmd files. Do not triage over ScreenConnect itself. ConnectWise published indicators of compromise on its Trust Center advisory, listed on this page in defanged form. An earlier BleepingComputer report also lists an installer pattern, attributed only to that report, that is not in ConnectWise's list.
What should we do first?
Follow ConnectWise first. Cloud customers need take no action for the extension. On-premises partners should disable RMM+ now, confirm it stays disabled, and also keep the other named RMM+ family extensions disabled, without re-enabling or reinstalling them pending further guidance. Update technician clients to 26.6.5 or later, then reinstall host clients and update access agents. Investigate with separate tooling, not interactive ScreenConnect sessions, isolate affected devices, and keep logs. Our advice on top: confirm every technician workstation is on 26.6.5 or later; remove unneeded third-party extensions; tighten who can use Run Command and Shared Toolbox; inventory on-premises extensions and remove the RMM+ family; set and rotate strong keys on any extension that uses one; restrict internet access to ScreenConnect web and API endpoints; and alert on unexpected extension API use. If a technician connected to an infected host, treat that workstation as suspect, end and revoke ScreenConnect sessions and cookies, rotate credentials, and review what the account touched. If you find signs of compromise, isolate, then from a trusted device revoke sessions, rotate credentials, and confirm cleanup before reconnecting.
What is SCKit, and did it spread to technician machines?
Security researchers, cited in a BleepingComputer report published at 22:53 GMT on 12 November 2026, describe SCKit as a toolkit of 16 scripts and components used in this campaign. It deploys rogue ScreenConnect Access clients on customer endpoints, pointing at attacker-controlled servers, uses RelayTrap (RelayTrap.cs, compiled on the device by a PowerShell script) to replace the ScreenConnect Guest process, and uses TrapWatch to monitor ScreenConnect services. When a technician opens an interactive session, RelayTrap tries to push and run a file on the technician machine using CVE-2026-84869. If that hop succeeded, other components would try to steal ScreenConnect session cookies, enumerate endpoints, and push commands via Shared Toolbox. Researchers have not seen that jump succeed in this campaign. In a reproduction against a current client, not in the live attack, the Guest side queued the transfer but the current client never requested or ran the payload. Console takeover attempts failed in recovered logs. Researchers said they had no evidence of a bypass at that time. We do not link or describe a proof of concept.
What is CVE-2026-84869, and is it in CISA KEV?
It is a ScreenConnect client flaw, not a server flaw. The NVD record quotes the ConnectWise CNA description: files may be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation in certain circumstances, and ScreenConnect servers are not impacted. The CNA score, shown on NVD and in ConnectWise's 8 September 2026 bulletin, is CVSS 3.1 9.9 Critical, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. NVD lists that score as Secondary. The bulletin also labels the issue severity as Important, with Priority 1 High. The fix is client 26.6.5 or later. After upgrading, ConnectWise tells partners to reinstall host clients and update access agents. CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 11 September 2026. That listing is separate from whether the technician-hop technique succeeded in this November campaign. CVE-2026-127063, the RMM+ issue, was not in KEV when we checked.
Who is this relevant to?
MSPs and IT teams that use ConnectWise ScreenConnect, especially on-premises instances with DataComm's RMM+ extension or the other named extensions in that family. Deployments without the extension are not affected by this CVE, but ConnectWise still advised all partners to stay on heightened alert and to verify that technician clients run 26.6.5 or later. Cloud-hosted instances had the affected extensions disabled and removed by ConnectWise.
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Sources
- CVE record: CVE-2026-127063 (ConnectWise CNA; datePublished 17:50 GMT on 12 November 2026; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- ConnectWise Advisories: CVE-2026-127063 disclosure (dated 12 November 2026; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- ConnectWise Trust Center: ScreenConnect security advisory, precautionary extension disabling and partner guidance (first published 22:45 GMT on 11 November 2026; latest update 18:45 GMT on 12 November 2026, status investigation ongoing, protective actions identified; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- ConnectWise: ScreenConnect security update, guidance for partners (dated 11 November 2026; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- ConnectWise: ScreenConnect hardening guide (linked from the advisory)
- ConnectWise: Uninstall an extension (linked from the advisory)
- NVD: CVE-2026-127063 (published 18:17 GMT on 12 November 2026, status Received when checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- SecurityWeek: Hackers Deploy Malware in Fresh ScreenConnect Campaign (12 November 2026, 10:39 GMT; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- The Register: Hackers exploiting ScreenConnect plugin flaw to spread malware across hundreds of PCs (published 13:02 GMT on 12 November 2026; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- BleepingComputer: Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations (published 11 November 2026, 22:56 GMT; last confirmed update 12 November 2026, 02:06 GMT; re-checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- BleepingComputer: New worm-like SCKit malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks (published 22:53 GMT on 12 November 2026, 17:53 Eastern Time; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- ConnectWise: 2026-09-08 ScreenConnect bulletin for CVE-2026-84869, client version 26.6.5 (checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)
- NVD: CVE-2026-84869 (published 20:18 GMT on 8 September 2026; last modified 4:16 GMT on 12 September 2026; status Analyzed when checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT; ConnectWise CNA score CVSS 3.1 9.9 Critical)
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (catalogue 2026.11.10, released 19:03 GMT on 10 November 2026; checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT; CVE-2026-84869 added 11 September 2026; CVE-2026-127063 was not listed)
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-84869 (date added 11 September 2026; catalogue 2026.11.10 when checked at 12 November 2026, 23:44 GMT)